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Tech platforms serve as private courthouses for disputes about speech, lodging, 
commerce, elections, and reputation. After receiving allegations of defamatory 
content in top search results, Google must decide between protecting one person’s 
public image and another’s profits or speech. Amazon adjudicates disputes 
between consumers and third-party merchants about defective or counterfeit items. 
For many small businesses, layoffs and bankruptcy hang in the balance. This 
Article uncovers the processes that these platforms use to resolve disputes, and 
proposes reforms. Other powerful businesses that intermediate, such as credit card 
companies ruling on a disputed charge between a merchant and consumer, must by 
federal law provide timely notice, a reasonable investigation, and other procedural 
minimums. In contrast, platforms have almost unfettered discretion. Under intense 
public pressure, Facebook recently began building an independent oversight board 
that can overrule content moderation decisions. But whether other platforms will 
follow is unclear, and Facebook’s oversight board has significant limits. If 
platforms are to continue as the primary arbiters of disputes in the information age, 
they warrant mandated procedures as did financial institutions before them. The 
procedures would aim to improve the administration of justice through public 
accountability and separation of at least one of platforms’ executive, legislative, 
and judicial powers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the fall of 2017, the world’s largest social network put hundreds of women 
in “Facebook jail,” indefinitely suspending their accounts for posting “men are 
scum.”1 Such incidents have contributed to a growing realization that internet 
platforms are the “new governors” of speech.2 But the societal impact extends 
beyond speech. By suspending an account, Facebook, Twitter, and other social 
networks can sever quarantined or vulnerable populations from their support 
networks.3 Amazon has swiftly destroyed many entrepreneurs’ livelihoods by 
delisting them.4 Despite being the leading referee of reputation, Google usually 
declines to intervene,5 thereby ensuring that one law student’s interviewers saw her 
through the lens of false accusations that she “slept her way into Yale.”6 The 
platform ecosystem wields devastating sanctions beyond silencing speech.  
Additionally, the emphasis on governance obscures another institutional 
dimension: dispute resolution. The widespread posting of “men are scum” 
originated as one woman’s response to sexist comments.7 Amazon often delists one 
seller based on another seller’s or a consumer’s accusations, sometimes fabricated 
for self-serving purposes.8 From the perspective of one of these small merchants, 
“Amazon is the judge, the jury, and the executioner.”9 Although scholars analogize 
platforms to “sovereign states,” the focus is not on how these entities handle 
disputes.10 Since a platform is a site “where interactions are materially and 
                                                 
1 Simon van Zuylen-Wood, “Men Are Scum”: Inside Facebook’s War on Hate Speech, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 
26, 2019), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/02/men-are-scum-inside-facebook-war-on-hate-speech. 
2 See, e.g., Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online 
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1625-49 (2018) (describing how moderators, acting in “a private self-
regulatory system to govern online speech,” enforce the rules they create for their users); Kyle Langvardt, 
Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1357 (2018) (analyzing the constitutional concerns 
with content moderation by online platforms and advocating for Congressional action to limit the reach of this 
content moderation); Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 278 (2014) (“Digital 
speech intermediaries possess and exercise a new kind of control over the speech of individuals, associations, 
groups, and communities.”). 
3 See infra Section I.B. 
4 See infra Section I.A. 
5 Infra Part I.D. (discussing Google’s role in reputation markets). 
6 See Caitlin Hall, Swimming Downstream: Battling Defamatory Online Content via Acquiescence, 19 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 287 (2007) (describing how after her acceptance to Yale Law School became known in 
online admission boards the author was subjected to harassment by strangers that a job interviewer later 
referenced).  
7 See van Zuylen-Wood, supra note 1. 
8 Dzieza, supra note 9 (describing a fake review setup by a competitor that succeeded in suspension).  
9 Josh Dzieza, Prime and Punishment, THE VERGE (Dec. 19, 2018) 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/19/18140799/amazon-marketplace-scams-seller-court-appeal-
reinstatement (quoting a small business owner who went through Amazon’s dispute process). 
10 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 199-201 (2017) 
(analyzing how platforms’ “role in the international legal order increasingly resembles that of sovereign 
states”); Klonick, supra note 2, 1641-42 (focusing on platforms’ executive and legislative functions, including 
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algorithmically intermediated,”11 the inattention to dispute resolution has left a vital 
organ of power in the information age underappreciated.  
This Article begins to fill that gap by illuminating the inner workings of what 
has become society’s most important private judicial system. Drawing on official 
company policies, unofficial complaint forums, interviews, and other sources, it 
provides case studies of the dispute processes designed by Airbnb, Amazon, 
Facebook, and Google.12 It then offers a framework for reforming those internal 
civil procedures. 
This project builds upon and integrates three remarkably distinct strands of 
scholarship. The most directly in dialogue is that on platform governance—one of 
the most vibrant, visible, and vast bodies of literature over the past few decades. 13 
Scholars in this area have emphasized that platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, 
Google, and Amazon exert quasi-public influence over commerce, speech, 
elections, and myriad other spheres of activity.14 Those analogies between 
platforms and governments provide normative foundations for procedural 
regulation because the Due Process Clause constrains state actors’ rulings.15 The 
comparisons also implicitly show why platform dispute resolution merits greater 
                                                 
promulgating and enforcing rules). A related analogy paints platforms as administrative agencies—which, like 
states, have executive, legislative, and adjudicatory functions. See, e.g., Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global 
Platform Governance: Private Power in the Shadow of the State, 72 SMU L. REV. 27, 29 (2019) (arguing that 
“platforms are acting as regulators” and “are performing quintessentially administrative functions”); Rory Van 
Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1272-74 (2017) (discussing platforms’ regulatory and 
quasi-legislative function); infra Part III.E. (discussing the analogy to administrative agencies). These and other 
scholars discuss dispute resolution by platforms along the way to larger projects. See sources supra; see also 
JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 
7, 143 (2019) (exploring “the design of dispute resolution systems and institutions for the era of informational 
capitalism.”); Aluma Zernik, The Invisible Hand, the Regulatory Touch, or the Platform’s Iron Grip?, (work-
in-progress) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3490884. 
11 Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, supra note 10, at 136. 
12 Given the limits of interviews and desire of most to remain confidential, wherever possible a publicly 
available source was used instead.  
13 For a review and categorization of early works in this vein, see Lawrence B. Solum, Models of Internet 
Governance, in INTERNET GOVERNANCE: INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS 48, 57-58 (2009); for more recent 
examples, see, e.g., supra note 10.  
14 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 5 (2d ed. 2006) (observing that computer “code is cyberspace’s 
law.”); K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the 
Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1632 (2018) (observing that platforms can “exercise[] quasi-
sovereign authority and influence over not only workers but the economy and society as a whole . . . .”); Ganesh 
Sitaraman, Regulating Tech Platforms: A Blueprint for Reform, GREAT DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE 3, 5 (2018), 
https://greatdemocracyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Regulating-Tech-Platforms-final.pdf 
(comparing tech platforms providing “essential services” to public utilities); Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an 
Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 335, 336 (2014) (warning of platforms’ ability to shape elections); see also 
supra note 10. 
15 Danielle Citron’s groundbreaking call for technological due process showed how constitutional 
principles could broadly be applied to technology. That concept will be explored in greater depth below, 
although Citron’s original work can be distinguished because it was not focused on tech platforms or dispute 
resolution and relies on administrative agencies as the government analog. It nonetheless provides valuable 
foundations on which this Article builds. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1249, 1249 (2008) (arguing that administrative agencies’ use of technology should be subjected to due 
process); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated 
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 23 (2014) (concluding due process is needed for automated scores produced 
by those creating credit scores, without discussing dispute resolution function or online platforms). One of the 
Article’s contributions is extending the due process analysis to platforms’ dispute resolution system. Section 
III.A. 
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attention. The U.S. Constitution divides authority among three branches. To focus 
only on the state as a whole, with passing references to the judicial branch, would 
insufficiently explicate how the state governs. If the pervasive analogies between 
platforms and governments are to be taken seriously, platforms’ judicial role must 
be taken seriously as well.  
Platform procedure also speaks to a second, far less visible body of scholarship: 
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”). ADR scholars have begun to use 
technology to operationalize procedural justice in businesses—especially cross-
border marketplaces like Amazon and eBay.16 But they have mostly emphasized 
how companies can voluntarily adopt informal, non-adjudicatory mechanisms for 
improving dispute resolution—such as online mediation, which allows the parties 
to work it out.17 They pay less attention to how the law might require firms to 
improve formal adjudicatory processes.18 
The ADR literature sits in tension with the third foundational strand of 
scholarship, procedural privatization. Both strands share a broadly defined goal of 
access to justice.19 But whereas ADR scholars embrace alternatives to courts, 
procedural privatization scholars, mostly from the perspective of civil procedure 
and contracts, tend to critique the inability to access courts.20 They have filled 
volumes documenting the problems surrounding a particular type of ADR: 
mandatory arbitration.21 In contrast to ADR scholars’ emphasis on confidentiality, 
privatization scholars decry arbitration’s lack of transparency.22 Procedural 
                                                 
16 See generally TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (summarizing the procedural justice 
literature suggesting that process heavily influences perception of legitimacy); Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan 
Katsh, Technology and the Future of Dispute Systems Design, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 151, 198 (2012) 
(arguing for “novel approaches” to integrating technology into dispute resolution). 
17 See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, There’s an “App” for That: Developing Online Dispute Resolution to 
Empower Economic Development, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 43 (2018); Heather Scheiwe 
Kulp & Amanda L. Kool, You Help Me, He Helps You: Dispute Systems Design in the Sharing Economy, 48 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 179, 216 (2015). For an early take on online dispute resolution, see David A. Hoffman 
and Salil K. Mehra, Wikitruth Through Wikiorder, 59 EMORY L. J. 151, 170-74 (2009). 
18 But see Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547, 560 (2016) (describing 
the internal dispute processes of American Express, Amazon, and other platforms and proposing regulatory 
oversight). 
19 See, e.g., Amalia D. Kessler, Arbitration and Americanization: The Paternalism of Progressive 
Procedural Reform, 124 YALE L.J. 2940, 2942, 2992 (2015) (exploring the tensions between ADR proponents 
and their critics). 
20 See, e.g., David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 370 STAN. L. REV. 363, 370 (2018) (arguing that 
the combination of arbitration clauses and delegation clauses, which allow arbitrators to delegate whether 
arbitration should proceed, has allowed “corporations [to] draft[] around [the] prophylactic layer of judicial 
review”); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Court, and 
the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2936 (2015) (arguing that the new reliance on a private, arbitral 
judicial system works as “an unconstitutional deprivation of litigants’ property and court access rights”).  
21 Mandatory arbitration refers to the practice of businesses inserting clauses into their form contracts that 
require consumers to use arbitration for any disputes. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 
(2011) (“[C]ourts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, and enforce them 
according to their terms.” (internal citations omitted)). There have been numerous symposia and collections on 
the topic. See, Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1593 (2005) (publishing 
as part of a Stanford Law Review symposium emphasizing class actions and arbitration); Kessler, supra note 
19 (writing as part of a Yale Law Journal collection on mandatory arbitration); Roger H. Trangsrud, Class 
Actions and Access to Justice, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 595, 596 (2014) (referring to a symposium at George 
Washington).  
22 See Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of 
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privatization scholars have also painted binding arbitration as “a clandestine effort 
to tilt the scales of justice,”23 resulting in “an unconstitutional deprivation of 
litigants’ property and court access rights.”24 As this Article shows, similar critiques 
can be made of platform procedure.  
An integration of those three rich literatures is more than academic. Creating a 
judicial system with predictable procedures was pivotal to establishing a 
government built on laws: “The constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the 
existence of an organized society maintaining public order, without which liberty 
itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy.”25 Tech platforms have created a 
judicial system that plays an increasingly centralized role in maintaining public 
order. In significant contexts where financial platforms serve as gatekeepers for 
vital participation in society, federal laws regulate dispute resolution.26 For 
instance, for-profit credit bureaus—whose credit reports determine whether 
someone can obtain employment, receive a loan, or rent an apartment—must 
provide timely notice to each party and conduct reasonable investigations.27  
The time has come to consider analogous rules for large online platforms (called 
“platforms” below). A more imaginative legislative agenda would go beyond 
transparency to consider a broader array of procedures, such as user class actions 
and an independent appeals board. These mandates would provide an 
accountability structure for platforms’ formidable power to punish.  
Part I surveys how tech platforms resolve disputes. Part II provides reference 
points by examining existing mandates on platform procedure for credit card 
companies, credit bureaus, and online publishers. Because the literature has 
devoted the least attention to designing solutions, Part III comprises the bulk of the 
Article’s discussion. It begins to sketch a system for platform dispute resolution 
and provides options for specific rules, such as limitations on platforms’ 
termination of accounts.  
Before turning to the main discussion, several points of clarification are in 
order. This Article’s core question—how to reform private dispute resolution—
requires weighing economic, social, and moral factors. There is no uniformly 
embraced or rigorous equation for determining whether additional expenditures on 
an extra layer of procedure are worth the added equity or impartiality. Moreover, 
markets can pressure businesses to advance procedural justice, as I have argued 
elsewhere.28 The dynamic nature of platform procedure makes intervention more 
precarious.  
These and other analytic constraints are revisited in greater depth in the final 
section on objections. They are important and not to be dismissed lightly. The 
                                                 
Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1821 (2014) (“[T]he promise of confidentiality is a linchpin 
of ADR’s appeal . . . .”). 
23 Horton, supra note 20, at 440. 
24 Resnik, supra note 20, at 2936. 
25 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965). 
26 Infra Part II.B. (outlining the procedures mandated for credit card companies and credit bureaus.). 
27 15 U.S.C. §1681 (2018); infra Section II.B.2. 
28 See Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, supra note 18 (arguing that with the right competitive 
pressures some large companies’ private dispute processes offer people voice, speed, and often better outcomes 
than the law would provide ). 
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indeterminacy means that readers will, perhaps based on their priors, inevitably 
come to different defensible conclusions on the best path forward. At the same time, 
it is valuable to recognize that the reservations to legal action are in many ways 
universal to the challenge of regulating new industries, faced before in oil, banking, 
transportation, and elsewhere. And the difficulty in knowing the value of an extra 
layer of procedure was surely the case at the founding of the U.S. judicial system. 
This Article aims to highlight some of those similarities and provide a richer 
institutional account, which will inform the coming construction of a regulatory 
architecture for platforms. Additionally, although I believe that the law should 
mandate at least some procedural reforms, platforms could in the alternative adopt 
them voluntarily. The structures and rules below thus offer a menu of options that 
both private sector designers and public policy makers can use to build a more 
effective system of platform justice. 
 
I. PUNISHMENT BY PLATFORM 
 
The roots of platform sanctions lie not in public courts, but in private ordering. 
Even when platforms’ arbitration clauses do not block access to courts, the time 
and expenses involved make the formal legal system “effectively unavailable to all 
but wealthy individuals and businesses.”29 Moreover, courts defer to platforms’ 
internal rules for controlling user conduct.30 Below are case studies of those rules 
at four leading tech platforms, each representing a category: Amazon and other 
marketplaces join buyers and sellers, Facebook and other social media companies 
connect users and followers, Airbnb and other sharing economy enterprises pair 
customers and servicers, and Google and other search engines link information 
seekers to publishers.31  
 
A.  Marketplace Platforms: Amazon 
 
Third-party merchants account for more than half of Amazon’s sales.32 Initially, 
Amazon strove to minimize its involvement in disputes between sellers and 
consumers. In response to numerous early complaints about offensive book listings, 
the company announced that “Amazon believes it is censorship not to sell certain 
books simply because we or others believe their message is objectionable.”33 As 
another example, when buyers clicked on the link for filing a refund claim or 
leaving negative feedback, Amazon provided a pop-up notice saying, “You must 
                                                 
29 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Innovating To Improve Access: Changing the Way Courts Regulate Legal 
Markets, 143 DAEDALUS 83, 84 (2014). 
30 See, e.g., Prager Univ. v. Google LLC., No. 19CV340667, 2019 LEXIS 2034, at *1 (Cal. Super. Nov. 
19, 2019) (concluding that Google had no obligation to provide equal access based on ideology to earning 
money through YouTube); see also Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807, 1844 (2012) 
(“United States law permits a large measure of freedom for Facebook to set the terms of Facebookistan.”). 
31 Although platforms are blurring the distinctions between these categories as they expand, the nature of 
the relationships facilitated informs the disputes they resolve. On the blurring lines, see infra note 288 to 290 
and accompanying text. 
32 Joshua Fruchter, Amazon Takes Aim at Patent Infringement in its Marketplace, NAT’L L. REV. (July 12, 
2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/amazon-takes-aim-patent-infringement-its-marketplace (putting 
the figure at fifty-eight percent).  
33 David Streitfeld, Amazon Takes on Nazis, Book by Unsold Book, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2020, at A15. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576562
17-Apr-20]                            Platform Procedure   7 
contact the seller before filing a claim.”34 Now, however, book banning by Amazon 
has become common.35 And Amazon has developed an extensive and largely 
automated internal adjudicatory system that handles hundreds of millions of 
disputes annually, more than all U.S. courts combined.36  
The stakes can be high for these adjudications. The company’s main sanctions 
are product bans and account terminations.37 Many merchants have built their entire 
operations around Amazon’s promise of providing access to mass markets.38 When 
merchants suddenly lose access, it can leave them scrambling. Three-quarters of 
Amazon’s third-party sellers have between one and five employees.39 As one 
former Amazon employee, whose full-time job is now helping merchants navigate 
the Amazon appeals process, put it, “If they don’t get their Amazon account back, 
they might be insolvent, laying off 10, 12, 14 people, maybe more. I’ve had people 
begging me for help. I’ve had people at their wits’ end. I’ve had people crying.”40  
How are these suspensions and terminations determined? An algorithm 
typically flags an account for suspension, but a human is often involved later in the 
process, particularly once someone appeals the suspension.  Amazon identifies 
problematic sellers partly through an algorithm that monitors “defective” orders. 
An algorithm flags sellers for having a high defective order rate, and Amazon 
deactivates accounts with defect rates above one percent.41 The buyer makes an 
order defective by (1) leaving negative feedback, (2) filing a claim with Amazon, 
or (3) requesting that the credit card company reverse the transaction.42  
For negative feedback, ratings of one or two stars out of five are considered 
defective.43 Merchants can immediately challenge feedback with a few clicks on 
Amazon’s Feedback Manager portal.44 An Amazon bot then takes the first pass at 
determining whether to remove the feedback. For instance, the bot erases feedback 
containing profane language—including, in at least one case, the word “damn.”45 
                                                 
34 Tara Johnson, How to Deal With Amazon A-to-Z Claims, TINUITI (Aug. 31, 2018), 
https://tinuiti.com/blog/amazon/amazon-a-to-z-claims/.  
35 See Streitfeld, supra note 33. 
36 See, e.g., AMY J. SCHMITZ & COLIN RULE, THE NEW HANDSHAKE: ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND 
THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 9-12 (2017) (comparing dispute volumes). 
37 See generally Jane K. Winn, The Secession of the Successful: The Rise of Amazon as Private Global 
Consumer Protection Regulator, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 200-02 (2016) (providing an overview of enforcement 
mechanisms at Amazon). 
38 Scott Shane, Amazon’s Expansive, Creeping Influence in an American City, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2019, 
at A1. 
39 Fruchter, supra note 32 (putting the figure at seventy-three percent).  
40 Dzieza, supra note 9. 
41 Order Defect Rate, AMAZON SELLER CENT. HELP, 
https://sellercentral.amazon.com/gp/help/G200285170 (last visited Jan. 15, 2020) (Amazon seller account 
login required). 
42 Id. 
43 About Feedback Manager, AMAZON SELLER CENT. HELP, 
https://sellercentral.amazon.com/gp/help/external/help.html?itemID=761&language=en_US&ref=xx (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2020) (“Negative feedback: 2 or 1 stars”). 
44 See id. (“In View Current Feedback you can . . . Request removal of incorrect feedback (depending on 
certain cases).”). 
45 See Feedback Removal Win!, AMAZON SELLER CENT. FS., 
https://sellercentral.amazon.com/forums/t/feedback-removal-win/427603 [https://perma.cc/K8X4-PECE] (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2020). 
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The bot also looks for certain words, such as “defective,” that indicate the review 
may be valuable, and thus more important to preserve even if a seller complains.46 
Merchants can respond to the feedback, so that anyone viewing the post will get 
both sides of the story.47 However, merchants’ formal options for removal are 
overall limited, and the site is plagued by fake reviews.48   
A separate dispute resolution process unfolds when buyers request a refund. 
Under its guarantee program, Amazon provides refunds to buyers if an item does 
not arrive within three days of the expected delivery date, the buyer received the 
wrong item, or the buyer returned the item to the merchant without receiving a 
refund.49 If the item meets one of these criteria, Amazon deducts the funds from the 
seller’s account.50 The seller receives an email detailing the buyer’s grievance and 
must respond within three days.51 Based on a review of this information, Amazon 
decides whether to rule for the buyer or seller. If the platform decides to uphold the 
refund request, merchants can appeal within 30 days by providing further 
evidence.52 Although a high “defective order rate” is a primary avenue for account 
suspension, a seller can file a complaint about another seller by clicking a “Report 
abuse” link.53 Amazon is notoriously quick to freeze accounts at the first sign of an 
issue.54  
That readiness to suspend accounts allows sellers to exploit the dispute 
resolution process to sabotage competitors. Sellers create fake glowing reviews on 
competitors’ sites, aiming to trigger Amazon’s automated policing system that 
continually monitors for suspicious entries.55 Even merchants who have recognized 
the ploy, and attempted to alert Amazon to the presence of such fake positive 
reviews on their product pages, have still found their accounts suspended.56 In one 
case, Amazon delisted a small seller because its rival, Snuggle Pet Products, alleged 
that the seller’s puppy sleep aid infringed on patents.57 The claim was spurious, 
based on one unenforceable patent from 1895 and another for an unrelated Japanese 
                                                 
46 Can Amazon Remove Buyer Feedback?, AMAZON SELLER CENT. HELP, 
https://sellercentral.amazon.com/gp/help/20231 (last visited Jan. 15, 2020) (Amazon seller account login 
required) (noting that Amazon will remove feedback upon merchant request if it is profane, solely about the 
product rather than the purchase experience, or uses personally identifiable information). 
47 See About Feedback Manager, supra note 43. 
48 Gregory Magana, Amazon is Beset by False Product Reviews, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 17, 2019, 10:26 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-fake-product-review-problem-2019-4 (explaining that Amazon has 
struggled to reliably automate the identification of fake reviews). 
49 About A-to-z Guarantee, AMAZON HELP & CUSTOMER SERV., 
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201889410 (last visited Feb. 4, 2020). 
50 Id.  
51 Pooja Vishant, An Amazon Seller’s Guide to A-to-Z Guarantee Claims, MEDIUM (Sept. 15, 2016), 
https://medium.com/@pooja_ios/an-amazon-sellers-guide-to-a-to-z-guarantee-claims-cd61bd48f943.  
52 Id.  
53 Amazon Community Guidelines, AMAZON, 
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=help_search_1-
3?ie=UTF8&nodeId=201929730&qid=1526424694&sr=1-3 (last visited Jan. 18, 2020). 
54 See Dzieza, supra note 9 (describing how Amazon’s first move is to freeze a seller’s account with its 
initial notification of a problem before the appeals process begins). 
55 See, e.g., Magana, supra note 48 (“Amazon has deleted thousands of reviews to minimize fakes.”). 
56 See Dzieza, supra note 9. 
57  Complaint at 2, Wanna Play Prods. Inc. v. Emery, No. 00010-AT (N.D. Ga. 2020). 
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“combustion device.”58 But the puppy sleep aid vendor had to go to federal court 
to make its case, and in the meantime lost considerable sales from the suspension 
of its best-selling item.59 Amazon responded in 2019 by launching a patent 
adjudication system relying on patent lawyers as third-party adjudicators.60 
Although some terminations are permanent, sellers have the opportunity to 
appeal.61 The burden rests on the suspended account holder to satisfy Amazon 
regarding the alleged behavior by submitting a “plan of action to reinstate selling 
privileges.”62 To help navigate a bewildering process, law firms and consulting 
practices have sprung up dedicated to “Amazon reinstatement.”63 For some 
categories of disputes—such as allegedly fake reviews—the company’s process 
rewards sellers who admit guilt and explain how they will rectify the behavior 
moving forward, like a convicted criminal offering a reentry plan.64  
Amazon is one of many online marketplaces, such as eBay and Alibaba, 
operating extensive and high-volume dispute processes.65 It is difficult to know the 
truth and representativeness of any particular depiction of an erroneous or unfair 
outcome. Still, unproven allegations are an almost necessary initial step toward 
governmental investigation and action in almost any sphere. Either way, these 
private judicial systems are worthy of attention due to their magnitude, 
transparency limits, and ruinous sanctions. In the words of one former Amazon 
employee, “it is a system of guilty until proven innocent.”66  
 
B.  Social Platforms: Facebook  
 
Suspending accounts and taking down content are everyday events in major 
social networks. In the 2018 “Grab Them By The Ballot” campaign, organizer 
Dawn Robertson sought to increase voter turnout by posting untouched images of 
women of all ages who were nude except for, say, a small balloon covering a private 
part.67 The campaign took off but also received intense criticism and complaints 
from large numbers of users on Facebook and Instagram.68 The networks responded 
by suspending Robertson’s accounts.69 Because Facebook can “engineer” elections 
                                                 
58 Id. at 26. 
59 Id. at 38. 
60 Kaity Y. Emerson, From Amazon’s Domination of E-Commerce to Its Foray into Patent Litigation: 
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and increasingly influences decisions such as whether to vaccinate children,70 there 
are few more pressing tasks for democracy than figuring out access and 
misinformation on social networks. 
In addition to cutting off vital avenues for speech and sharing information, 
account termination may deprive a user of valuable property. One Facebook user’s 
account was “permanently disabled” after his brother passed away. Because he used 
his Facebook account to save most of the pictures he had of his brother, he lost 
access to them.71 In another case, a writer in New York slowly built the pieces of 
her book on Instagram only to have her account suspended indefinitely due to an 
alleged copyright violation for only a tiny portion of her photos.72 
In its early days, Facebook—which owns Instagram—relied heavily on users 
flagging questionable behavior to moderate content and suspend accounts.73 Now 
it relies heavily on a “classifier,” or bot, to flag problematic content and accounts, 
trained on employees’ removal practices.74 Once suspended or terminated, the user 
faces obstacles to rejoining even with a fake account. Facebook has what it calls 
“advanced detection systems” that swiftly deactivate a new account linked to a 
previously suspended party even if opened with a different email, on a different 
computer, and in a different location.75  
Traditionally, Facebook gave, at best, a vague explanation for suspending an 
account. It might simply state the reason as “suspicious activity.”76 However, the 
company’s approach shifted beginning in 2018, as the social network came under 
intense public and bipartisan congressional criticism for its censorship, election 
influence, and privacy missteps.77 In the wake of those challenges, to improve 
transparency the company made the unusual decision to publish its content 
takedown procedures, which it contended had “long been in place.”78 Facebook 
committed to publishing any changes in a searchable archive.79 Further, Facebook 
said it would notify the poster of any removed comment.80 The poster then has the 
option of challenging that decision, at which point, within 24 hours, the original 
decision will be reviewed by a human.81 For instance, after content moderation 
algorithms flagged many posts about the coronavirus from legitimate information 
                                                 
70 See Zittrain, supra note 14, at 336/. 
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75 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 71. 
76 Id. 
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sources—such as from USA Today—a large volume of complaints prompted the 
company to fix the underlying bug in the code that had caused the problem.82 Thus, 
fourteen years into its existence Facebook began offering an internal appeals 
system.83 
The company similarly resisted addressing misinformation at first, but under 
pressure pursued a middle ground. Facebook prefers not to remove content, and 
instead limits the distribution of spurious posts and of all content by accounts 
repeatedly found to share fake news.84 The company is thus the ultimate “arbiter of 
truth and falsity in the practical sense that it chokes off distribution of purportedly 
false content.”85 But it bears emphasis that it makes those determinations as a third 
party—not only because users help to identify material in need of a closer look, but 
also because Facebook has partnered with independent fact checkers, including the 
Associated Press.86 Those fact-checkers reflect court-appointed neutrals allowed in 
the federal rules.87  
Facebook acknowledges that its “enforcement isn’t perfect.”88 And those 
subject to the ultimate punishment—expulsion—have often found the processes 
inadequate. That inadequacy has driven many desperate users to seek alternatives. 
Another suspended user went to Facebook’s careers website, but instead of 
submitting a job application, petitioned for account reinstatement.89 A human 
resources employee responded to clarify that job postings were inappropriate for 
such a request—but the employee still resolved the issue.90  
Those desperate for a second look at their case now have another option. 
Originally described by Zuckerberg as a kind of “Supreme Court,” the new 
Oversight Board has the authority to overrule content moderation decisions by 
applying the companies’ policies and weighing the “public interest.”91 Facebook 
users can request that the Board review other users’ posts, putting the board in a 
dispute resolution position.92 The Board will also issue public explanations for its 
rulings and value the precedent set by prior decisions.93 Because it remains in its 
infancy and is the first of its kind, the Board’s ultimate contribution to Facebook’s 
platform procedure is unknown. But it is one of several reforms that have moved 
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Facebook towards procedural justice in the “age of alternate facts.”94  
 
C.  Sharing Platforms: Airbnb 
 
Airbnb leverages the threat of account suspension to maintain quality control, 
stating that it suspends accounts if a host rejects too many reservations, responds 
too slowly, or receives low ratings.95 A broader set of foundations for suspension 
include complaints from guests about specific incidents. For example, one host’s 
account was blocked after she said to her black guests, “Which monkey is going to 
stay on the couch?”96  
Although most cases are not so clear-cut, Airbnb states that it does not need to 
justify the reasons behind its suspensions.97 The lack of explanation frustrates hosts, 
many of whom have shared their stories on a website for grievances by guests and 
hosts, airbnbHELL.98 Sometimes the company mentions a vague rationale for 
locking an account, such as “security reasons,” without providing further 
explanation.99 Because many people rely on Airbnb income to pay their bills, and 
some purchase homes depending on that income to pay the mortgage, mistakes can 
lead to missed payments and even foreclosure.100 More so than Facebook’s, 
Airbnb’s adjudications implicate property interests analogous to those in traditional 
constitutional due process proceedings.101 
Airbnb’s sanctions also include marking the host’s account. For instance, users 
will see a notification on a listing if the host has previously canceled a reservation 
within 24 hours.102 These procedures punish the host for conduct assumed to have 
caused a prospective guest discontentment, even in the absence of a complaint.103  
Guests have also found their accounts suspended. Cadence Lux, an adult 
performer who used the site to find a safe place to sleep while traveling, had her 
account closed unexpectedly.104 Airbnb also denied her from opening an account 
                                                 
94 Cf. Allison Orr Larsen, Constitutional Law in an Age of Alternative Facts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 175, 219 
(2018) (discussing the stakes of and responses to the decline of object facts). 
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how they can do this without giving a reason and a chance for us to resolve.”). 
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seizure of consumer goods without a hearing). 
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under her legal name, stating that her identity was “associated with activities that 
pose a risk to the Airbnb community.”105 Similar interference with people’s ability 
to travel affordably and safely—if adopted widely in the travel industry—could 
lessen freedom of movement and equal treatment that many take for granted. 
Lux’s termination illustrates a predictive dispute-prevention strategy. An 
Airbnb patent describes artificially intelligent technology that scans people’s online 
life to “determine a trustworthiness score or compatibility score of the person based 
on the behavior and personality trait metrics using a scoring system.”106 The tool 
can lower a score if the user has “authored online content with negative language, 
or has interests that indicate negative personality or behavior traits.”107 Airbnb 
explains how it uses this technology on its website, stating, “We use predictive 
analytics and machine learning to instantly evaluate hundreds of signals that help 
us flag and investigate suspicious activity before it happens.”108 Another way of 
viewing this technology is as a means of preventing others from having negative 
experiences—or preventing disputes from ever arising. An individual classified as 
risky has no recourse or even visibility into the grounds for that determination. 
 
D.  Search Platforms: Google 
 
The results of search engines such as Google exert a tremendous influence on 
people’s reputations and speech visibility.109 That responsibility requires Google to 
intermediate disputes between seekers, providers, and subjects of information. For 
instance, fans disgruntled with the final season of Game of Thrones manipulated 
Google search results so the two lead writers’ names would appear first when 
anyone searched for “bad writers.”110 The tactics used, known as “Google 
bombing,” have numerous high-profile successes, such as yielding President 
George W. Bush as the top listing when anyone entered “miserable failure” 
following his widely criticized disaster-relief response to Hurricane Katrina.111 
Google admits in its official blog that it sometimes intervenes directly to squash 
these efforts, although it has not disclosed how it reaches those decisions.112  
Google bombing illustrates a point of differentiation from Amazon, Facebook, 
and Airbnb. In most instances, only one of the parties has established a contractual 
relationship with Google related to the dispute. Amazon and Facebook certainly 
implicate third parties external to their platforms, through the sale of counterfeit 
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goods or postings about non-users.113 But the core conflicts for those other 
platforms directly result from both parties voluntarily participating in the platform. 
Inclusion in a Google search requires no such consensual participation. Game of 
Thrones writers cannot exempt themselves from being discussed on web pages and 
small businesses have no say in whether Google allows users to rate them on a five-
point scale.  
One of the fundamental tensions giving rise to search disputes is between 
website publishers seeking prominence and the subjects of those sites wanting 
privacy—or at least accuracy. Google’s ruling on what to leave prominent 
determines commercial success, dating prospects, and hiring decisions.114 Its quasi-
judicial role is prominent in Europe because lawmakers have created a “right to be 
forgotten,” requiring search engines to decide whether each request to delist a web 
page satisfies the statutory conditions.115 Less well understood from a dispute 
resolution perspective is that even in the U.S. Google similarly intermediates. Upon 
request, the company delists explicit content and sensitive information, including 
financial and medical data.116 It also considers petitions to expunge sites that engage 
in “exploitative removal practices,” such as requiring people to pay to eliminate 
mugshots.117  
Google has made requests to take down approved categories of information 
relatively easy for users. The user clicks through a series of online forms with 
straightforward, multiple-choice questions such as, “Have you contacted the site’s 
webmaster?” and “I want to remove…” followed by a list of categories of 
information.118  
Although filing requests is relatively seamless, the company has also wholly 
withdrawn itself from adjudicating large categories of disputes. Google does not 
delist business review websites, such as RipoffReport.com, even if they engage in 
exploitative behavior.119 Thus, websites can force a mom-and-pop shop to pay to 
avoid having its reputation tarnished. The search engine has similarly refused to 
involve itself in disputes related to its ubiquitous Google business review pages, 
which allow anyone to rate businesses on a five-star scale.120  
Like with Amazon reviews, competitors and consumers have weaponized 
Google reviews.121 Some who are not even customers of the business have 
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demanded payment to refrain from leaving negative feedback, and many small 
businesses have found their revenues plummet upon the appearance of allegedly 
fake Google reviews.122 For instance, Gee McCracken built a web-based weight 
reduction company that grossed over a million dollars in sales annually, but what 
she insists are inauthentic reviews scared away her customers.123 After contacting 
Google, she summarized her experience by saying, “I could not get anyone to listen 
to me.”124 Her company dissolved, along with her life savings.125 Google’s official 
policy pages reinforce McCracken’s observation, by announcing that “Google 
doesn’t get involved when merchants and customers disagree about facts, since 
there’s no reliable way to discern who’s right about a particular customer 
experience.”126  
Shielded by the Communications Decency Act,127 the search engine also long 
declined requests to delist defamatory statements, hate speech, and 
misinformation.128 Google thus has attempted to stay neutral in the face of an 
emerging “post-truth society” in which “what is true matters less than what we want 
to be true.”129 Following public backlash because the top result “for a search of 
‘jew’ was the URL jewwatch.com, a site featuring anti-Semitic content,” Google 
responded that “it does not ‘remove a page from [its] search results simply because 
its content is unpopular or because we receive complaints concerning it.’”130 The 
company has softened that stance somewhat in recent years and now demotes hate 
speech and related content, but still strives to avoid involvement in conflicts among 
seekers, subjects, and publishers of information.131 Indeed, even when courts have 
ordered Google to take down content, the company is as likely to ignore the court 
order as comply.132 Google essentially operates as a higher authority, reviewing de 
novo the accuracy and desirability of state and federal court defamation rulings.133  
Notably, Google’s early content architects describe their operations in legal 
terms. The original takedown policies arose organically, but erred heavily on the 
side of free speech and accessibility. Over time, users and content moderators—
sometimes pressured by the public—flagged issues that challenged existing 
policies, and the team would then escalate to a set of content decision makers.134 
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For instance, by the late 2000s, for YouTube video takedowns the ultimate content 
determinations went to a committee of three of the company’s most senior 
executives.135 That committee would rule on the policy, including opining on 
specific cases, such as whether videos extolling weed should be allowed.136 
Although the people have changed and layers were added, that basic internal 
appeals structure still exists, beginning with front-line content moderators and 
escalating up through bosses to—in some extreme cases—the CEO.137 The rest of 
the organization “adjudicates” those updated policies aiming for “consistency” and 
“following precedent.”138 The process evokes images of the founding of a legal 
system.139  
In at least one other way, however, Google’s process is very different from the 
U.S. court system: limited visibility for those punished. Unlike a merchant on 
Amazon, a business owner listed in Google’s rating pages, or whose website 
appears in its searches, has no account with Google unless it is an advertiser. But 
Google has maintained a sharp separation between its search and advertising arms, 
and thus for purposes of search treats those with advertising accounts no 
differently.140 Thus, unlike users subjected to sanctions by other major platform 
categories, those demoted in search results will not learn about that development 
upon signing into their account. A business must search for itself to learn of its 
demotion.141 Moreover, Google’s silence makes it impossible for a company that 
suddenly finds itself on page four of the results instead of page one to know whether 
it dropped on the merits or out of punishment. 
In short, Google is more than a neutral provider of search results. Its status as 
the world’s most important information gatekeeper thrusts it into the middle of 
disputes. Compared to Amazon, Facebook, and Airbnb, Google more extensively 
avoids dispute resolution by exempting whole categories of conflict and often 
cutting accused parties out of the process. Even when refusing to adjudicate, 
Google is in a courthouse-like role. After all, some courts can refuse to hear cases. 
When lower-level employees have subject matter jurisdiction, they apply rules 
established by chief-level executives and clarified by internal case history. The 
complainant may wait hoping for the demotion of degrading content, unaware that 
moderators already denied the petition. Those whose speech has disappeared may 
not know they were even part of a secretive adjudicatory process until after Google 
renders a verdict.  
 
E.  Summary of Platform Adjudication 
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Most large platforms have developed intricate and extensive procedures for 
adjudicating disputes—or for declining to do so. These online systems implicate 
real-world livelihoods—the ability to work, travel, socialize, speak publicly, and 
stay reputable. Unlike federal courts’ procedural rules, however, platforms’ rules 
are influenced by an economic analysis that prioritizes profit. In part for this reason, 
platforms originally sought to cut costs by letting parties handle disputes 
themselves—and to the extent possible, continue to prefer that approach today.  
From those laissez-faire origins, large online intermediaries have developed 
organizational tools to act swiftly and decisively, sometimes after only one event. 
Their sanctions—as with courts—may be either monetary or injunctive. 
Marketplace platforms choose between these two sanctions, and can immediately 
debit merchants’ accounts to reflect the outcome of consumer claims. Platforms 
that do not as routinely process transactions, such as Google and Facebook, have 
more limited monetary remedies. They and marketplace platforms instead wield the 
ability to block access to the commercial world or a means of public speech and 
visibility in the digital age.  
There is no guarantee that a human will hear a case. Platforms can adjudicate 
through algorithmic assessments of current and past behavior—including unrelated 
behavior from myriad external data points collected by other tech companies, such 
as social media posts. Akin to an accused criminal receiving notice that a prosecutor 
has pressed charges, users may suddenly receive initial notifications that they have 
violated an Amazon, Airbnb, or Facebook rule. In the best-case scenario, the users 
may then have the opportunity to respond. However, often the first communication 
is more like a trial court judge’s initial ruling. At that point, often the only avenue 
is an appeal—whether formal or informal—with an assumption of guilt rather than 
innocence. The expanded privatization of American justice through platforms’ 
internal dispute systems deserves scrutiny. 
 
II. EXISTING PLATFORM PROCEDURE  
 
One of the key policy decisions moving forward is the extent to which platform 
decision-making will remain private. This Part lays the foundations for that inquiry 
by reviewing the existing federal laws imposing significant procedural oversight 
for credit card billing errors, credit report mistakes, and copyright violations. These 
laws’ successes and failures will later inform the template for new platform 
procedures. 
 
A.  Credit Card Companies as Adjudicators 
 
Like Amazon and Airbnb, many financial institutions operate as platforms in 
that they facilitate transactions between two independent parties. For instance, 
when Los Angeles resident Elah Feder found a new apartment the landlord asked 
her to transfer the $1,500 deposit through Venmo, a mobile payment app.142 Thirty 
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minutes later, she received a message: “Pretty sure you have the wrong person.”143 
Feder had accidentally spelled her landlord’s name as Stephen, instead of Steven.144 
However, Stephen refused to return the money unless instructed to do so by 
Venmo.145 Nor would Venmo intervene, despite the written admission from the 
recipient stating that it was a mistake.146 Mistaken transfers are common on Venmo, 
but the company simply tells the transferor to “send a message through the app.”147 
Ultimately, getting money back on Venmo depends on a lawsuit or the kindness of 
strangers who received an unexpected windfall.148 
Mistakes are also common with credit card purchases. Through the 1960s, 
credit card companies often ignored consumers’ protests about merchant billing 
errors or fraud.149 That response left the consumer simultaneously fending off a 
credit card company demanding payment and an antagonistic retailer. Now, 
however, credit card users can fix problems like the one that Feder faced easily and 
immediately. 
The 1974 Fair Credit Billing Act mandated that any consumer who uses a credit 
card be able to challenge an erroneous charge, for reasons including not receiving 
the goods, having received goods that did not conform, or being the victim of 
fraud.150 Because credit card companies have existed for considerably longer than 
tech platforms, they provide examples of one type of platform’s developed dispute 
resolution systems. Normally by pressing a button on the credit card’s website and 
filling out a few online forms,151 the consumer initiates that process, known as a 
“chargeback” because the card issuer immediately subtracts the disputed balance 
from the amount owed by the consumer.152 The process ultimately requires the 
credit card issuer to rule for one side.  
Before ruling against a consumer, the credit card issuer must at least conduct a 
“reasonable investigation” within 90 days and explain to the consumer the reasons 
for rejecting the claim.153 Moreover, upon request, the credit card issuer needs to 
provide documentary evidence for why it rejected the claim.154 Although mandated, 
the credit card company’s adjudication gets its authority not from any public law, 
but from the contract, in which the consumer and merchant agree to subject 
themselves to the chargeback process.155  
Courts have interpreted the statutory requirements as imposing minimal 
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burdens on both disputing parties. In Burnstein v. Saks Fifth Avenue, the plaintiff 
submitted a chargeback claim because she believed that Saks had billed her twice 
for the same jackets and pants.156 She had flagged the duplicate transactions on the 
phone to Saks Fifth Avenue, but the credit card issuer argued that she had failed to 
specify the exact dollar amounts in her formal letter to the company.157 The court 
rejected that argument: “The utility of the [statutory] dispute resolution scheme 
would be greatly diminished if a creditor could simply throw up its hands and opt 
out of the statutory process upon encountering any ambiguity or lack of specificity 
in a consumer’s claim.”158 The ease of triggering the statutory process increases 
access to dispute resolution for unsophisticated consumers.  
Credit card issuers also receive considerable leeway in how they fulfill their 
requirements. Courts typically decline to second-guess the substantive outcomes of 
chargeback investigations—or as the Burnstein court put it, “There is . . . no penalty 
for ‘wrong guesses’ made in good faith.”159 Federal law “establishes only the 
procedural framework for dispute resolution, and does not concern itself with the 
substantive outcome of this process.”160 Following that influential ruling, courts 
have interpreted the requirement that credit card issuers undertake a “reasonable 
investigation” as requiring only “a reasonable attempt to investigate.”161  
ADR scholars have criticized chargebacks as insufficient because of limited 
consumer awareness and the lack of opportunity for amicable settlement.162 Some 
have also taken issue with the remedies, which do not allow for damages beyond a 
refund.163 There are inevitable abuses in providing consumers with an “undo 
button,” as demonstrated by one married couple who initiated a chargeback after 
the wedding because the colors on their wedding cake were too bright.164 But the 
baker ultimately received payment after submitting photos of the couple and guests 
laughing and eating the cake, along with screenshots of guests raving about the 
dessert.165 The process thus ensures that both sides have the chance to respond to 
baseless accusations. 
Scholars in fields outside of ADR, especially consumer advocates, view 
chargebacks more positively. One of the main goals for chargebacks was providing 
a mechanism for consumer protection.166 Among consumers who use chargebacks, 
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satisfaction is high—they rarely complain about the process or bring suits.167 Part 
of this satisfaction stems from financial institutions’ strong legal incentive to rule 
in favor of consumers, which allows them to avoid investigating.168 An estimated 
eighty to ninety percent of consumers are successful upon bringing a chargeback.169  
Regardless of whether consumers win, however, chargebacks provide them 
leverage through a dispute resolution mechanism that is free, accessible, and fast.170 
The law prevents questionable practices, such as responding to the chargeback by 
submitting or threatening to submit a negative report about the consumer’s credit 
record.171 And the immediate reversion of funds into the consumer’s account serves 
as a kind of temporary injunction, preventing a cash-strapped borrower from having 
to pay a crushing and inaccurate debt—or be subject to collection efforts—until 
resolution of the matter.172 Chargebacks also give a voice to consumers who 
otherwise would have no plausible avenue for being heard.173  
Nor have those benefits to consumers necessarily come at the expense of 
merchants. Another principal goal of the system was facilitating commerce by 
fostering trust. Because consumers feel secure in using credit cards, merchants 
benefit from increased sales, and financial institutions earn revenue from a greater 
number of transactions.174 Moreover, issuers automate much of the process of 
resolving chargeback disputes, using artificial intelligence, which lowered costs 
compared to the earlier prevailing option of disputing a canceled check.175  
Thus, although chargebacks may fall short of relationship-oriented processes 
embraced by ADR scholars, they are quick and efficient while still allowing both 
sides to submit evidence. The case of credit cards illustrates how a category of 
platforms has successfully implemented a private dispute resolution system 
because of government directive.  
 
B.  Credit Bureaus as Adjudicators 
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The big three credit bureaus, Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion, make 
decisions about disputes between third parties.176 These three companies provide 
credit reports, accompanied by a FICO score, for almost every American adult. The 
reports consist of information mostly from financial institutions, including credit 
card companies’ details about late payments or maxed out card limits—either of 
which would drive someone’s credit score down.177 The bureaus mediate conflicts 
when the third party reports information that the consumer believes is inaccurate, 
and wants removed from the record. The subjects of their disputes most closely 
resemble those of search engines: misinformation and reputation.178 
The stakes of these disputes are immense. Credit reports inform decisions 
including whether someone qualifies for loans, credit cards, and bank accounts.179 
About half of employers also pull credit reports before hiring someone, and 
landlords check them before renting to a tenant.180 For these reasons, observers 
have remarked that someone who has lost their good credit navigates society with 
a Scarlet Letter and is “dead to the world.”181 That characterization is sometimes 
literally true. In one case, the court upheld James McKeown’s lawsuit against 
Equifax for failing to adequately process his dispute about information on his 
record provided by the department store Sears.182 Sears had reported McKeown as 
deceased, which made it difficult for him to obtain a loan.183  
In part to ensure that such disputes “function fairly, accurately, and 
efficiently,”184 Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970.185 Under the 
Act, consumers have the right to inspect their reports.186 Upon request, credit 
bureaus must disclose “key factors” that may have negatively affected a consumer’s 
score,187 essentially requiring an explanation of the potential reasons for any credit 
denial. Upon receiving a consumer complaint, they also must “follow reasonable 
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the 
individual about whom the report relates.”188 The statute thus sets in motion a 
compulsory dispute resolution process with the credit bureau as an intermediary 
between the consumer and the furnisher of credit information, such as a bank 
reporting the non-payment of a loan. 
Once the consumer has produced information contradicting the credit bureau, 
courts have interpreted the statutory investigation mandate as necessitating 
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additional verification beyond the original source.189 In Dennis v. BEH-1, Experian 
listed in a credit report a prior debt collection lawsuit against Jason Dennis by his 
landlord as successful.190 That description matched the court register’s erroneous 
initial description of the case, but the court clerk later correctly filed the final entry 
as “Dismissal Without Prejudice.”191 Dennis informed Experian that its listing was 
incorrect, and Experian obtained the final stipulation between Dennis and his 
landlord through a contractor who described Experian’s information as accurate.192 
The court held that Experian fell “far short” of reasonable diligence because instead 
of looking at the file in its possession, it relied on the top-level mistaken assertion 
of the contractor.193 When consumers take the unusual step of filing a lawsuit, 
courts have proven willing to uphold claims of unreasonable procedures.194  
The resulting system is far from perfect. A high number of consumers’ files—
25% in one study—have material errors that could influence the credit score.195 
Furthermore, observers have argued that the procedures required of credit bureaus 
provide inadequate transparency and fail to impose liability sufficient to discourage 
bureaus from conducting a rubber stamp investigation.196  
Despite these flaws, the procedural mandates may still be helping if the error 
rate and procedural injustices would otherwise be even higher. Moreover, credit 
bureaus have different incentives than do credit card companies and most tech 
platforms. Most notably, whereas users can leave most online networks,197 they 
cannot opt out of having credit reports collected about them. As a result, like 
Google, credit bureaus have weaker incentives than either credit card companies or 
Amazon, Airbnb, and Facebook to design dispute resolution processes that appeal 
to consumers.  
Notwithstanding these differences, the case of credit bureaus is instructive in 
weighing analogous mandates for online platforms. The discussion below draws on 
shortcomings in the credit bureau system to improve the proposed design for online 
intermediaries.198 Additionally, credit bureaus provide another example of 
congressional willingness to impose procedures on platforms that play a central role 
in many spheres of human activity. The FCRA’s legislative history reveals that the 
act’s drafters intended “to protect an individual from inaccurate or arbitrary 
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information.”199 Online platforms are susceptible to related challenges.200 Congress 
was particularly concerned about the increasing speed of information transfer—
already, in 1970—raising the potential for injustice and significant injuries. Credit 
bureau regulations demonstrate that an information gatekeeper’s harsh mistakes 
can drive procedural legislation.  
 
C.  Platforms as Copyright Adjudicators  
 
Businesses lose billions of dollars annually because websites share copyrighted 
materials without payment.201 Congress did not want the fear of copyright 
violations to have a chilling effect on the internet, so instead of punishing a platform 
when a third party posts illegal content, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 
1998 (DMCA) established a detailed process to resolve disputes between the 
alleged copyright holder and alleged copyright infringer.202  
When a platform, or other online publisher of third-party information, receives 
a compliance notice that material on its site violates copyright law, to be protected 
from liability it must remove the material “expeditiously.”203 Disney sent out a 
barrage of these takedown requests to Etsy, Vulture, and other sites for wildly 
popular Baby Yoda merchandise listed shortly after the beloved character’s initial 
appearance in Mandalorian.204 After receiving these takedown notices, the 
platform is instructed to notify the alleged infringer of the takedown and send any 
“counter notice” from that party to the alleged copyright holder.205 The online 
service provider then can place the material back on the Internet and still avoid 
liability if the accuser does not file a lawsuit within ten days.206 The DMCA thus 
puts online service providers into the role of a private adjudicatory system, 
coordinating communications between the two parties and ultimately administering 
a ruling on whether to delete the content and terminate accounts for repeat 
infringement.207  
The law has had the intended effect of shielding publishers from litigation, as 
“the vast majority of [takedown] notices likely are never subject to the scrutiny of 
a court.”208 Instead, the system emphasizes efficiency.209 Most large companies 
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automate the takedown process, creating chaotic “algorithmic law enforcement.”210 
Online publishers must respond to large numbers of automated notices by other 
companies, with Google alone receiving half a billion takedown requests in 2015.211 
Companies holding significant copyrights also often err on the side of challenging 
content, such as one movie studio’s automated system sending a takedown request 
for a school student’s book report about Harry Potter posted online.212  
From a dispute resolution standpoint, the copyright regime is flawed.213 The 
online publisher’s default response is to take down content to avoid liability, 
without, for example, stopping to analyze whether it should instead leave up an 
original 45-second stop-action Lego movie produced by a 10-year-old boy.214 This 
has encouraged the internet’s growth by lessening the likelihood that online content 
publishers will be sued for third-party copyright violations. But empirical evidence 
indicates that large companies abuse the takedown process, often causing the 
removal of perfectly legal content.215 
One of the DMCA’s major shortcomings is the counter notice provision, which 
aims to protect the content poster by allowing it to respond to the takedown 
request.216 A large-scale survey found that parties rarely send counter notices, in 
part because “the typical target of a DMCA complaint has little or no knowledge of 
copyright law, and little capacity to make informed estimates of the risks attendant 
on filing a counter notice.”217 The few who do use the counter notice provision may 
be copyright pirates, from locations such as Russia and the Ukraine, who know the 
copyright holder will not file a lawsuit in their foreign jurisdiction.218  
Like with credit card chargebacks,219 the DMCA incentivizes a particular 
outcome. Specifically, to qualify for safe harbor liability protection, the platform 
should resolve the dispute in favor of the last party to comply with the statutory 
sequence of back-and-forth communications.220 The copyright holder has the last 
shot because if it files a lawsuit, the platform must take down the material to benefit 
from the liability shield.221 The platform could decide to leave the material up if it 
thought the case was invalid, but it would be taking a risk in doing so. 
Although flawed, obligatory copyright dispute resolution expands the sphere of 
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mandated procedures beyond financial institutions. The DMCA demonstrates that 
large online platforms already must comply with a complex, federally mandated 
procedural system for at least one type of dispute. The Act also indicates how a 
failure to consider power and information asymmetries—particularly how wealthy 
firms might coopt the system—can undermine the ideals of balanced dispute 
resolution.  
Procedural directives are not limited to the contexts discussed in this Part. Laws 
also require insurers, and non-intermediaries such as airlines, to take specific steps 
in resolving conflicts with their customers.222 The array of examples normalizes a 
policy intervention that might otherwise seem strange and extreme: treating a 
private company like a public entity forced to follow detailed compulsory 
procedures in resolving customer disputes. The discussion below will draw on these 
examples in exploring the design and normative foundations for a broader set of 
federal rules. 
 
III. ENHANCED PLATFORM PROCEDURE 
 
The challenges posed by platform dispute resolution demand a rethinking of the 
absence of procedural oversight in the tech sector other than for copyright issues. 
Two main questions frame the path forward. First, what are the normative 
foundations for new mandates? Second, what might such mandates entail?  
  
A.  Normative Foundations for Mandating Platform Procedure 
 
The discussion so far offers normative foundations by analogy. In response to 
preliminary evidence of flawed dispute resolution in other important platform 
contexts, lawmakers have imposed procedural minimums.223 With their opacity, 
provocation of discontent, and crushing sanctions, Amazon, Facebook, Google, and 
other online platforms arguably offer insufficient dispute resolution.224 In light of 
the similarities to financial platforms, Congress could decide to impose procedural 
mandates on tech platforms.  
Although the policy case could rest on that analogy, the decision on whether to 
intervene would benefit from a deeper normative framework. Constitutional law 
offers a relevant lens through due process.225 To be clear, as a matter of 
constitutional law, due process protections do not apply because platforms are not 
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public actors.226 The doctrine nonetheless supplies a framework for providing 
minimum procedural safeguards before depriving someone of liberty or property.227 
Specifically, the Supreme Court has established three factors to weigh in such 
instances:  
 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.228 
 
In terms of the first factor, commercial platforms serve as gatekeepers to 
markets, deciding which companies gain or maintain access.229 To be delisted by 
Google is to become “invisible to the general public.”230 The Court has elsewhere 
acknowledged that social networks function as the “modern public square” because 
they “are perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to 
make his or her voice heard.”231  Platform procedure clearly implicates substantial 
private interests.  
The second factor in the due process framework is the risk of erroneous 
decisions.232 Given the private nature of platform conflicts, inadequate information 
exists about the overall performance of these dispute resolution processes. 
However, anecdotal, judicial, and empirical information paints a bleak picture of 
arbitrariness and discrimination.233 Academics have demonstrated that Google 
systematically shows lower-paying job advertisements to women than men,234 and 
based on similar evidence Facebook settled lawsuits by the American Civil 
Liberties Union and others.235 As one former Amazon employee describes the 
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company’s dispute resolution process, the result is “very inconsistent and hit or 
miss. You’re at the mercy of a different person each time. And that person’s 
performance assessment is based on the number of cases completed, not the quality 
or consistency of the decision.”236 There is a sensible basis for concluding that 
platforms’ erroneous decisions are unacceptably high.  
The motivation for mandating credit report procedures speaks to the first two 
due process factors. According to a congressional sponsor of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, which imposed dispute resolution on credit reporting companies: 
“We certainly would not tolerate a government agency depriving a citizen of his 
livelihood or freedom on the basis of unsubstantiated gossip without an opportunity 
to present his case. And yet this is entirely possible on the part of a credit reporting 
agency.”237 In the platform context, Amazon and Uber deprive some small business 
owners of their livelihoods by delisting them without allowing them to present their 
cases.238 A modern form of “unsubstantiated gossip”—product reviews and driver 
ratings—often drives these suspensions.239 Processes designed to minimize this 
unsubstantiated gossip would decrease the likelihood of error.   
The final factor, the platform’s interests, infuses the due process analysis with 
a practical limitation. It would be unrealistic to require a full trial for every account 
suspension, even if the risk of error would decrease. We must therefore examine 
what the burden would be of imposing a given procedure. 
Costs to the platform are not solely monetary. If the law prohibited Amazon 
from suspending the account of a merchant selling defective products, consumers 
and the platform could be harmed from the procedural delay—and thus from the 
imposition of additional procedures. This third prong may limit mandates that 
unreasonably restrict the platform’s interest in acting expediently against harmful 
users. 
The more straightforward application of this third prong, however, is the cost 
of administering additional procedures. As a starting point, platforms already have 
extensive systems in place.240 Depending on the new procedures that would be 
adopted, the costs could range from minimal to substantial. A rule requiring 
extensive discovery would be costly. But since most of these processes are already 
automated, allowing a party to submit information in an online form to be provided 
to the adjudicator would be low-cost.241 Again, the cases of credit agencies, credit 
card chargebacks, and copyright takedowns speak to the third factor. Financial 
institutions and online platforms have thrived despite the costs of compulsory 
procedures for large-volume disputes.242  
                                                 
rights-workplace/facebook-settles-civil-rights-cases-making-sweeping (summarizing lawsuits filed). 
236 Interview with McCabe, supra note 66. 
237 115 Cong. Rec. 2412 (1969) (statement of Sen. William Proxmire). 
238 See supra Section I.A. 
239 Supra note 55 and accompanying text (describing the role of reputation at Amazon). 
240 See supra Part I. 
241 SCHMITZ & RULE, supra note 36, at 52 (identifying how online dispute resolution can reduce these costs 
by automating certain processes).   
242 For example, many of the top twenty firms are financial institutions and technology companies that 
would be required to comply with both copyright and chargeback processes. See Fortune 500, FORTUNE, 
https://fortune.com/fortune500/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2020). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576562
28                                               Platform Procedure [17-Apr-20 
Additionally, there is strong evidence that the added trust and legitimacy gained 
from effective dispute resolution systems improves a company’s profitability due 
to better customer retention and increased customer engagement.243 Yet businesses 
sometimes focus so excessively on the short term, growth, or their core products 
that they ignore the importance of dispute resolution.244 The monetary gains from 
improved dispute resolution lessen the costs in the due process analysis. Thus, 
while the final factor helps determine which procedures to adopt, it does not defeat 
a proposal for mandating at least some.  
Again, a due process analysis is unnecessary for lawmakers to order platforms 
to change their behavior. As mentioned above, the state has ordered financial and 
online platforms to play the role of courthouse in other contexts, without relying on 
a due process justification.245 The necessity of solving an important problem thus 
typically dictates the policy, rather than an explicit normative framework.246 
Nonetheless, the due process analysis provides support for legislation mandating 
minimum platform procedures and informs the harder question of which specific 
mandates to adopt.  
 
B.  New Structural Checks and Balances 
 
This section begins to sketch the blueprint for federal rules of platform 
procedure (“Platform Rules”). A threshold issue is how to define success. The 
Supreme Court’s due process doctrine provides guidance by emphasizing that the 
extent of the procedures should grow with the gravity of the potential injustice—as 
long as the corresponding burden for implementing those procedures is not too 
high.247 However, due process sets the constitutionally acceptable floor,248 and thus 
has lower ambitions than a designer seeking to build a platform dispute system that 
maximizes either effectiveness or legitimacy. For instance, due process allows an 
administrative agency to use an adjudicator upon appeal who is the peer of the 
original adjudicator in the same office.249 This arrangement would be unacceptable 
for a designer wanting a more neutral arbiter to maximize procedural justice, which 
consists of voice, respect, speed, trustworthiness, and neutrality.250  
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Instead of using the constitutional floor as the standard, the policy prescriptions 
below assume the goal is to create the most socially beneficial platform judicial 
system possible. That high aspiration will inevitably leave many questions 
unanswered. Yet it flows from the consensus among law and technology scholars 
that in the face of networked harms in large numbers, if “dispute resolution is to 
yield institutions for the production of justice, a more comprehensive process of 
institutional reinvention will be necessary.”251 
In light of that objective, this Article’s procedural references go beyond due 
process to draw on two projects that are closer to those facing tech intermediaries 
in the upcoming years. The first is the federal effort to build a judicial system. The 
second is ADR scholars’ efforts to create an entirely privatized system of online 
dispute resolution.252 Of course, it would be a mistake to impose a private version 
of the cumbersome Federal Rules on platforms.  It would also be a mistake to adopt 
perfection as the standard for a privately mandated system, since every existing 
judicial system has shortcomings. Ultimately, the goal is to balance efficiency, 
innovation, and procedural justice to improve the mass dispute resolution process 
for the information age, whose construction is already well underway. 
Ideally, some of the design features below would be required, based on the 
normative case outlined above. But they offer a variety of possibilities regardless 
of the path forward. Policy makers can choose from them whether the goal is to 
impose minimums or aim higher. Alternatively, tech executives could use this set 
of ideas to adopt voluntary dispute resolution, a possibility that is not as far-fetched 
as it may appear.253  
 
1. Platform Common Law  
 
Some, if not all, platforms already value precedent. Facebook has taken a step 
toward building a common law for content moderation. The founding documents 
for its Oversight Board specify that “any prior board decisions will have 
precedential value and should be viewed as highly persuasive when the facts, 
applicable policies, or other factors are substantially similar.”254 Other platforms 
would also benefit from moving toward greater consistency in the application of 
their internal policies. After all, precedent adds predictability and fairness to the 
law, while lessening the arbitrariness of excessive adjudicatory discretion.255 Since 
                                                 
251 JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL 
CAPITALISM 169 (2019). 
252 See, e.g., ETHAN KATSH & ORNA RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE INTERNET 
OF DISPUTES 21-22 (2017) (pushing for truly virtual dispute resolution that improves efficiency and fairness); 
SCHMITZ & RULE, supra note 36, at 52 (explaining how entire dispute resolution processes can rely heavily on 
algorithms to the benefit of both consumers and businesses). 
253 Infra Part III.E. (discussing the appeal to industry of robust dispute resolution). 
254 OVERSIGHT BOARD CHARTER, supra note 92, at 5; see also Molly K. Land, The Problem of Platform 
Law: Pluralistic Legal Ordering on Social Media (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3454222 
(expanding on existing notions of platform law). 
255 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW, LITTLE, BROWN, & CO. 1 (1881). It is debatable 
whether “highly persuasive” is the right standard, as opposed to seeing prior decisions as something closer to 
binding, as do the Supreme Court and circuit courts in many contexts. On prior court decisions as binding, see 
generally, for example, Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 2 (2005). Most circuit courts have adopted “law of the circuit” rules that bind subsequent circuit court 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576562
30                                               Platform Procedure [17-Apr-20 
large platforms today can deliver divergent rulings faced with the same set of 
facts,256 anchoring verdicts in prior cases would improve the administration of 
justice. Of course, some level of transparency would be essential for users to be 
able to predict likely outcomes and argue their cases based on prior decisions.257 
A more difficult question is how different platforms’ decisions should influence 
one another. Should Twitter’s resolution of an identical content moderation 
question have any bearing on how Facebook decides a given case? Clearly, 
different categories of platforms—marketplaces and social networks—will 
generally require different platform laws. Therefore, they must have some leeway 
to adopt context-specific decrees and tailored procedures. That need for customized 
substantive rules does not, however, prevent interconnections.  
If greater precedence across platforms is desirable, common law courts offer a 
model. Decisions in the same jurisdiction on the same topic carry the greatest 
weight, but other jurisdictions’ cases on the same topic can be influential. By 
analogy, like states, platforms may adopt their own substantive rules. Twitter may 
then consider the decisions of another platform, such as Facebook, in making its 
own decision, without having its autonomy infringed. The degree of relevance 
should be influenced by the similarity of the platform and the particular issue being 
decided.258  
 
2. Platform Courts of Appeals 
 
Pushing platforms toward greater internal consistency, and facilitating the use 
of other companies’ related decisions as persuasive authority, is valuable but leaves 
open the possibility that a platform will perpetuate its own unsound decisions. 
TripAdvisor’s recent missteps illustrate the potential downsides. The company has 
long been the leading source of online travel information.259 It hosts reviews of 
hotels, restaurants, and other travel services through a user-generated five-star 
rating system, accompanied by written reviews.260 But the company takes down 
reviews without public disclosure or notification to the reviews’ authors.261 In many 
instances, users posted about being the victims of crimes only to have their reviews 
removed.262 For one resort, multiple guests reported that after having a single drink 
at the pool, they became incapacitated and awoke later in their hotel room, assaulted 
and robbed.263 Because TripAdvisor erased the reviews, the resort remained the 
highest rated in its category, causing subsequent travelers to choose it and meet a 
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similar fate.264  
The assaulted users who had their posts removed were not without alternatives. 
Upon exhausting platforms’ internal dispute processes, many users look to informal 
avenues. Amazon buyers ask their credit card to cancel the purchase,265 and emails 
to Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos have yielded refunds for buyers and reinstatement for 
sellers.266 Facebook users take to Twitter to complain, or leave “profane comments” 
on CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s Instagram account.267  
Although those options sometimes produce results, they have limits. An assault 
victim should not have to take to social media and reveal a very private and painful 
event to the world to get a response. Moreover, users with few followers have less 
social media influence. Appealing to the CEO may go nowhere. Like many 
platforms, TripAdvisor has perverse incentives to keep the ratings attractive, 
because it depends on advertising revenue.268 No hotel would pay to advertise so 
that people can learn about recent assaults on its premises.  
In the face of such misaligned incentives, internal precedent and persuasive 
authority are insufficient. An independent appeals process, staffed by judges with 
sufficient salaries, was crucial for the development of American common law.269 
An independent party would be more likely to overturn a platform’s profitable but 
misguided precedent.  
Congress should thus consider mandating that each large platform fund an 
external appeals structure comprised of salaried judges. However, to minimize the 
risks that industry would capture the appeals body, the platform must not control 
either the level of funding or selection of judges. In some ways, a company-specific 
appellate body would simply be a more independent version of what credit card 
companies and credit bureaus are required to do for dispute resolution—since those 
processes require firms to pay a group of employees to adjudicate chargebacks.270  
An alternative would be industry-specific appeals bodies, funded in proportion 
to each large platform’s share of industry revenues. A single private board could 
hear appeals for all social media companies, such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
TikTok; another for all marketplaces, and so on. Under this model, by analogy, the 
district court would be the platform’s internal adjudicatory process, with the 
appeals board serving as a circuit court.  
Weighing in favor of a circuit model is the similarity of issues across multiple 
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content sharing networks, such as harassment and misinformation.271 Additionally, 
these platforms are expanding users’ ability to link their accounts and posts across 
platforms.272 Finally, grouping multiple platforms’ appeals within a single court 
improves economies of scale, adjudicator expertise, and platform law consistency.  
Under either model, appeals courts would be required to overturn a platform’s 
decision when it is either inconsistent with that platform’s precedent, or when the 
platform’s precedent is inconsistent with the broader set of cross-platform policies 
and laws.273 In this regard, the mandated appeals process would differ from 
Facebook’s Oversight Board, which must apply Facebook’s policies.274 Returning 
to the example of TripAdvisor, in deciding an appeal by users posting about crimes, 
the appeals court might look to other platforms’ policies about removing reported 
crimes, or prior cases on that subject. If the case is one of first impression, the court 
could look to related cases about removing non-crime information, as well as 
broader societal norms of advertisement accuracy, informational completeness, and 
public safety.  
The appeals board’s status as a nongovernmental organization would enable it 
to adopt more streamlined and innovative processes than the public court system.275 
However, checks are appropriate to avoid the extreme “process privatization” 
created by arbitration.276 Public courts could provide a check by preserving parties’ 
ability to challenge a given platform court of appeals’ decision.277 The interface 
between these public and private courts deserves further attention, but by default 
only a small percentage would appeal to public courts, given the existing obstacles. 
That option could be encouraged, or in the interests of promoting efficiency and 
subject-matter expertise, public courts may defer to platform appeals courts, similar 
to public courts’ deference to administrative agency adjudication.278 
The task of building a private appeals structure for billions of disputes is 
daunting. But tech platforms already handle that high volume annually.279 
Moreover, governments have successfully developed high-volume online appeals 
systems. Israeli insurers, for instance, successfully use an online system, Benoam, 
to handle appeals by customers of “fender-bender” property claims.280 Benoam is 
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private, but it has implemented some jurisprudential norms by publicly posting 
(anonymized) major decisions and clarifying rules.281  
Facebook’s decision to staff its Oversight Board with at most forty judges is 
informative. Over six months in 2019, Facebook alone removed 11.4 million hate 
speech posts and more than 3.2 billion fake accounts.282 The size of its Oversight 
Board indicates that at least one large-scale platform believes it can operate with a 
lean external judicial force.283 Nor is the scale of federal circuit courts particularly 
vast, with a typical court of appeals consisting of about 14 judges.284  
Like the federal system, the platform system would need to emphasize 
settlement, negotiation, and mediation.285 Users would only be able to externally 
adjudicate the most significant and novel cases. A sensible rule, already applied in 
other mandated dispute resolution contexts, would be to require parties to exhaust 
direct negotiation and internal procedures before initiating an external appeal.286 
Only a small subset would appeal, and the platform appeals board would only take 
an in-depth review of a fraction of those appeals. Nonetheless, the few precedential 
decisions would reverberate throughout the rest of the disputes handled by 
platforms, ideally aided by algorithms that identify similar cases to which the ruling 
is relevant.287 As a result, even randomly selecting a portion of the appeals petitions 
for a hearing could improve legitimacy, encourage the development of platform 
common law, and increase the likelihood of socially beneficial outcomes.  
 
3. A Platform Supreme Court 
 
A major design choice is whether there should be a central platform adjudicator 
above the appeals boards. One reason to prefer a centralized court is the remedies 
available in a world in which one user’s case may implicate many different 
platforms. By way of example, pediatrician Nicole Baldwin produced a playful 
TikTok dance music video to “Cupid Shuffle” about how vaccines prevent measles, 
polio, influenza, and other viruses, ending with a punchline of “Vaccines DON’T 
CAUSE AUTISM.”288 The video went viral across multiple platforms, including 
Twitter.289 She was subsequently barraged not only by death threats and other 
attacks on social media, but also by fake Yelp and Google reviews accusing her, 
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among other things, of “drugging injured autistic boys with transgenic pills.”290 
When a single incident requires intervention across multiple platforms, a 
harassment victim would ideally not need to go to multiple platforms for redress.  
Additionally, the functional distinctions across categories are beginning to blur. 
Google’s search foundations buttress its fast-growing shopping marketplace and its 
recent piloting of a social network called Shoelace.291 Facebook facilitates many 
commercial transactions, allows users to link a bank account, and has taken steps 
to open a currency.292 Amazon regulates speech by increasingly banning 
“offensive” books293 and filtering which reviews it will allow on its product review 
sites—reviews that are sometimes viewed by millions.294 If Dr. Baldwin had written 
a book prior to the vaccination video, reviews on Amazon could have easily been 
weaponized against her, as has happened to other authors.295 A single incident could 
therefore implicate similar adjudicatory issues across all large platforms.  
Thus, a central appeals court—a platform supreme court—may make sense. 
Indeed, although this terminal platform court would hear mostly appeals of the 
toughest and most novel cases, it or lower appeals courts should have original 
jurisdiction for pressing cross-platform cases requiring immediate injunctive relief. 
There are myriad ways to staff and implement a platform supreme court. The 
judges could be selected with inter-sectoral input, possibly allowing users, a 
regulator, and platforms to each select a subset of judges. Public oversight into the 
judge appointment process would help, such as an independent administrative 
agency signing off on the structure and staffing. An alternative proposal, made in 
the context of content moderation, is for the platform to “create a process that relies 
on a community, either of regional experts or the serious users.”296 Alibaba and 
eBay have experimented with similar crowd-sourced adjudication.297 In its early 
years, eBay established a “Community Court” of twenty-one randomly selected 
users to whom sellers could appeal if they disagreed with buyer feedback.298 A 
majority vote by the platform supreme court’s judges would remove the challenged 
feedback.299  
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The concentration of such great power in the hands of so few is a fraught 
undertaking. But greater power is in the hands of even fewer today—a handful of 
CEOs. They currently control the executive, legislative, and judicial functions in 
state-like platforms. Mandating a nongovernmental appeals system would provide 
a separation of at least one of those great powers. 
Many difficult details remain to be determined, like the standard of review for 
the private appeals hearings—whether deferential, de novo, or some other standard. 
It would be worthwhile to determine how, beyond the salary and the appointment 
process, to insulate the appeals bodies from undue influence by industry or a self-
serving President. The linkage of multiple public and private courts would also 
require more nuanced connective arrangements. However, the goal is not complete 
harmonization. Nor is complete insulation from influence realistic, or even 
desirable, in any system of governance. The platform supreme court would reflect 
what is in fact the norm in governance: polycentricism, defined as a system 
“characterized by multiple governing authorities,” both public and private, in which 
“each unit exercises considerable independence to make norms and rules within a 
specific domain.”300 With an independent appeals structure in place, most platform 
disputes would continue to unfold internally, shaped by localized community 
norms. Those internal processes would, however, become imbedded in a robust 
public and private accountability structure rather than left to autocracy.  
 
C.  New Platform Federal Rules 
  
With or without an independent appeals structure, mandated internal procedures 
close to those required of financial platforms could improve adjudication. The size 
of the platforms subject to such decrees would need to be set to avoid unduly 
burdening smaller or emerging platforms before they have the chance to establish 
themselves. Also, not all disputes will merit the same legal protections. For 
instance, it would be hard to justify procedural safeguards that might slow down 
Facebook and Twitter’s termination of Russian operatives’ election-oriented fake 
accounts. 
The public court system and administrative agencies have developed means of 
addressing these and other challenges of resolving heterogeneous claims, rooted in 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”).301 As characterized by the 
Supreme Court, “The basic purpose of the Federal Rules is to administer justice 
through fair trials, not through summary dismissals.”302 Over eighty Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”) exist, many with intricate sub-sections.303 It 
would be impractical to enumerate all of the possible corresponding rules of 
                                                 
300 The concept comes from Nobel-prize winning economist Elinor Ostrom. See Elinor Ostrom, 
Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global Environmental Change, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. 
CHANGE 550, 552 (2010). 
301 See FED. R. CIV. P.; infra notes 405 to 407 and accompanying text (explaining how the Administrative 
Procedure Act and related agency rules are modeled after the Federal Rules). 
302 Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966); see also Maria J. Glover, The Federal 
Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1715 (2012) (describing the goal of the Federal Rules as 
facilitating “truth-seeking” and “the resolution of cases on their merits). 
303 See FED. R. CIV. P. 
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platform procedure here, and many would be unwise to adopt. Instead, the 
discussion below highlights several promising ways to merge the formality of the 
Federal Rules with ADR principles of procedural justice.  
 
1. Standing and Equal Access to Human Adjudicators  
 
Access to justice is fundamental to democracy. As platforms plant themselves 
at the center of public discourse, access to their justice becomes integral to 
democracy. Two components are particularly important: a procedurally level 
playing field and standing for non-users.  
One of the necessary principles in platform procedure, and indeed a driving 
force behind many of the Federal Rules, is equal access.304 Public support for legal 
aid services, as well as procedural reforms such as class actions, aimed to expand 
access.305 However, even with these and other mechanisms, reliance on courts still 
meant “the haves come out ahead.”306 Initiating a lawsuit typically requires a 
lawyer, or at least the ability to pay court fees and navigate a labyrinth of procedural 
and substantive rules.307  
Left unregulated, platform justice risks exacerbating that considerable access 
inequality. Firms generally prioritize higher profit customers in resolving disputes, 
as demonstrated by a Bank of America patent for software allowing it to gauge 
whether to waive a fee depending, in part, on the amount of money a customer’s 
family has in their bank accounts.308 Similarly, credit reporting agencies provide 
VIP treatment to complaints about inaccurate records from a “judge, senator, 
congressman, government official, attorney, paralegal, professional athlete, actor, 
director, member of the media or a celebrity.”309 Like other businesses, some 
platforms prioritize their most valuable users, and can relegate the least valuable to 
justice by algorithm.310  
Equal access is also relevant to external parties harmed by platforms. Social 
networks and search engines can, for instance, determine election results or tarnish 
a non-user’s reputation. Online marketplaces can sell counterfeit goods, thereby 
harming the original producers even if they do not sell online.311  
                                                 
304 See, e.g., David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 1007 (2017) (“Devices such 
as notice pleading, liberal discovery, and liberal joinder seek to equalize litigants' ability to prove their claims 
and defenses.”). 
305 MAURO CAPPELLETTI & BRYANT GARTH, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: A WORLD SURVEY (Mauro Cappelletti 
ed., 1978). 
306 Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
307 Id. at 119-20.   
308 See, e.g., Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, supra note 18, at 566-68. 
309 Michael R. Guerrero, Disputing the Dispute Process: Questioning the Fairness of S1681s-2(a)(8) and 
S1681j(a)(1)(a) of the Fair and Accurate Credit Reporting Act, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 437, 450 (2011). 
310 See, e.g., Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, supra note 18 (describing technological advances 
broadly spreading companies’ abilities to identify higher-value users); Sofia Ranchordas, Online Reputation 
and the Regulation of Information Asymmetries in the Platform Economy, 5 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 127 (2018) 
(describing how platforms use scores to prioritize influencers). 
311 See Jon Emont, Amazon’s Heavy Recruitment of Chinese Sellers Puts Consumers at Risk, WALL 
STREET J. (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazons-heavy-recruitment-of-chinese-sellers-puts-
consumers-at-risk-11573489075 (detailing a small cleaning products manufacturer who was forced to lay off 
most of its staff after cheap counterfeits of its product were sold on Amazon). 
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Those external parties may have little if any influence because platforms 
prioritize their own users’ complaints. For instance, many publishers and authors 
have found counterfeits of their books sold on Amazon, which accounts for over 
half of all books sold in the United States.312 In one case, Amazon sold thousands 
of counterfeit copies of “The Sanford Guide to Antimicrobial Therapy,” which 
provides formulations for drugs used to combat pneumonia and other infections.313 
Besides the considerable lost revenues for the author and publisher, the copies 
posed a health risk: the poor copies’ formulas obscured minor print distinctions like 
that between a “7” and a “1” in the dosage.314 The publisher wanted to remain 
independent of Amazon, but the pirated books became so pervasive that its only 
viable solution was to allow Amazon to become its wholesaler—thereby giving the 
platform an incentive to police the counterfeits.315  
To address these access barriers, the dispute resolution system should be easy 
to navigate, free for individuals and small businesses, and afford all litigants 
comparable procedures. Credit card companies are also required to offer 
chargebacks free. Comparable procedures include the ability to have a human 
adjudicator at some point in the process for sufficiently important or nuanced cases. 
Something akin to the appointment of neutral experts or special masters, as federal 
rules allow in courts,316 could help address imbalances in users’ ability to navigate 
platform procedures. A navigable process, with straightforward explanations, will 
broaden access regardless of party sophistication. Equal access also means 
prohibiting favoritism based on status as a social media “influencer” or number of 
followers. Furthermore, non-users harmed by platforms should have standing in 
these private dispute processes—or at least the external appeals boards over them. 
Particularly in an age in which platforms tend toward monopoly power and 
dominate speech and markets,317 people should not have to join a platform to stop 
the harm.  
 
2. Timeliness and Transparency  
 
Two of the most fundamental dispute resolution characteristics are speed and 
transparency. When eBay analyzed why most buyers and sellers continued using 
the platform after entering its dispute resolution process, the surprising answer was 
not whether they won or lost.318 Instead, it was having the conflict resolved in a 
timely manner.319 Those findings have encouraged ADR scholars focusing on 
online dispute resolution to embrace reliance “on the intelligence and capabilities 
                                                 
312 Streitfeld, supra note 33.  
313 Id. 
314 Id. 
315 Id. 
316 FED. R. EVID. 706 (providing for court-appointed experts); FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (providing for special 
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317 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 197, at 1199. 
318 Colin Rule, Quantifying the Economic Benefits of Effective Redress: Large E-Commerce Data Sets 
and the Cost-Benefit Case for Investing in Dispute Resolution, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 767, 776 
(2012) (finding buyers who reached amicable dispute resolutions were more likely to return than buyers who 
simply achieved a full refund in their dispute).  
319 See id.  
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of machines.”320 Mandated dispute resolution systems for credit reports, credit card 
chargebacks, and online copyright takedown impose time constraints, such as 
ninety days to investigate and correct the credit card billing error.321  
Platforms should similarly have time limits imposed, in light of the value of 
speed to participants—particularly for suspended accounts and content moderation. 
But those limits would need to be adjustable based on the procedural complexity of 
the case and appeals level. If a case affects many users—for example because it is 
a class action or a precedent-setting higher court ruling—it could call for a longer 
timetable.  
In terms of transparency, an irony of platform justice is that the companies 
epitomizing the information age often provide almost no information upon 
adjudicating user disagreements or suspending privileges. The general opacity of 
algorithms and platforms is a common source of concern among scholars.322 
Transparency in dispute resolution, however, is not explored in those 
discussions.323  
To be clear, platforms communicate many substantive rules for what constitutes 
a violation.  Amazon, Apple, and Facebook provide thousands of pages on their 
expectations for community standards and app developer conduct.324 However, 
those rules sometimes omit key details. There is no list of books banned by 
Amazon.325 Nor does Airbnb publish all of the reasons why accounts may be 
suspended.326 More importantly, the reasoning for a decision remains largely 
secretive. Sellers shuttered by Amazon may never know what accusations were 
made against them or whether those accusations were falsely leveled by another 
merchant seeking a competitive edge.327 Nor do users know how or why the 
platform suspended their account.328 The platform has access to considerable 
information, but often the parties do not. 
The drafters of the Federal Rules prioritized information exchange.329 Platforms 
should at least be required to provide what credit agencies must: an inspection of 
the case for wrongful action.330 Automation can significantly lower the costs of this 
information exchange through online forms, as used for credit card chargebacks.331  
                                                 
320 Ethan Katsh & Colin Rule, What We Know and Need to Know About Online Dispute Resolution, 67 
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https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_bc_nav?ie=UTF8&nodeId=201909250 (last 
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Transparency is not a cure-all, and those with power can abuse it.332 
Information-sharing requirements would need to be relaxed in some contexts—
particularly cases involving harassment. And the visibility must reckon with 
inevitable resistance to revealing trade secrets.333 But transparency plays a crucial 
role in both individual disputes and at a systems level. Besides due process 
rationales, requiring the publication of some decisions—at least in an anonymized, 
summarized format—ensures that future parties benefit from past cases at that same 
platform.334 Parties can use prior rulings to plead their case to Amazon decision 
makers who lack the time or motivation to review past cases. Publicly available 
rulings thereby contribute to closer scrutiny of legal principles that might otherwise 
remain stagnant.335 Transparency thus would improve not only the quality of 
individual adjudications within a platform, but also the development of a platform 
common law. 
 
3. User Class Actions  
 
Many small harms may not be worth individuals’ time even if collectively they 
amount to societally harmful transfers of rights or resources from individuals to 
platforms.336 To address this problem, the Federal Rules provide for class 
actions.337 Recently, multi-district litigation—which combines cases from different 
jurisdictions—has become the tool of choice for aggregation.338 ADR scholars have 
begun to lay the foundations for leveraging automation to make aggregate online 
dispute resolution more feasible for private companies, with a leading motivator 
being to lower costs.339 When a user systematically harms others—or when the 
platform does so itself—an outlet for initiating collective grievances deserves 
consideration. Rather than a class action, it would be a user action. 
There are many possible ways to aggregate claims among users, and space does 
not allow for exploring them all or addressing their many critiques. Briefly, 
aggregation is another area where a special master or neutral party as the users’ 
                                                 
chargeback disputes). 
332 David Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 156 (2018) (discussing how 
corporations utilize transparency to access valuable information). For a further discussion of how transparency 
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STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018) (“A criminal trade secret privilege is ahistorical, harmful to defendants, and 
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334 On the value of transparency to precedent, see, for example, Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, 
Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 540 (2011). 
335 Cf. J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 2052 
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see generally Rory Van Loo, Broadening Consumer Law: Competition, Protection, and Distribution, 95 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 211 (2019). 
337 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
338 28 U.S.C. § 1407. 
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representative could further procedural justice. Some of the biggest obstacles in 
courts have been locating all class members, collecting relevant information, and 
processing distinctions among mass consumers.340 Because platforms would have 
such information readily available through their extensive monitoring, 
communications, and analytic tools, they could automate aggregation in ways not 
possible through traditional court actions.341 User actions could even relax the 
requirement in the Federal Rules that members be similarly situated, if the 
platform’s artificial intelligence can create ways to both group and tailor claim 
adjudication.342  
 
4. Injunctions and Bans 
 
Facebook, Amazon, and Airbnb are quick to suspend or terminate accounts at 
the first sign of an issue, sometimes with severe consequences for small businesses, 
property ownership, and participation in democracy.343 The Supreme Court has 
applied the Due Process Clause to analogous contexts. In Fuentes v. Shevin, a 
Florida resident challenged a state law that allowed the retailer Firestone—without 
any hearing—to enlist the sheriff to seize her gas stove purchased on credit.344 The 
Court held that “the possessory interest in the goods, dearly bought and protected 
by contract, was sufficient to invoke the protection of the Due Process Clause.”345 
Even when acting on behalf of a business, the state could seize property without a 
hearing only under “truly unusual” circumstances.346  
To address platforms’ analogous account deprivations prior to hearings, federal 
rules could establish boundaries for suspending a legitimate personal or small 
business account until the dispute is resolved. The more essential the platform 
service, the more procedural protections are relevant before cutting off access. 
Whatever the boundaries, it is imperative that platforms have some ability to limit 
the disruption of problematic users.347 Additionally, platforms must have the 
flexibility to act quickly in unusual circumstances. For instance, when harassment, 
hate speech, or other abusive behavior is involved, the immediate blocking of the 
accused from interacting with the accuser and deletion of posts makes sense. 
Similarly, when a product sold on Amazon threatens consumer safety, an 
immediate suspension of the product is justified.  
However, in many categories of harm, there will not be as compelling of a 
counter-interest. When one merchant points out that another small business has 
suspiciously glowing reviews on its Amazon site, it is excessive to delist the 
                                                 
340 See Alexander W. Aiken, Comment, Class Action Notice in the Digital Age, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 
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products without a prior investigation and giving the accused a chance to explain.348 
The writer who built her book material on Instagram should not have had her entire 
account permanently disabled because of allegations by one copyright holder of 
violations.349 When the interest on one side is preventing assault at a resort, 
indefinite blocking of even a single post without at least a rapid follow-up 
investigation also is inappropriate. More than one safety-related post by a verified 
user should immediately weigh in favor of leaving the content posted. 
Despite the delicate balancing act and context-specific nature of these inquiries, 
parameters are possible. For instance, the federal rules could consider the relative 
power dynamics of the groups—large businesses versus consumers, or harassers 
and harassed. Injunction-related procedures imposed on credit card companies 
clearly favored the consumer by blocking collections on a disputed debt until the 
matter is resolved.350 At a minimum, any account suspension or content takedown 
merit an accelerated timeline for investigation and resolution. Absent extenuating 
circumstances, account restoration should result immediately upon any ruling in 
favor of the accused along the chain of appeals.  
The rules should also disfavor extreme punishment when lesser sanctions exist. 
When removal of content or individual products would suffice, such as when there 
are no repeated offenses, the platform should face procedural hurdles in suspending 
accounts. And the procedural bar for permanent bans should be higher. Public 
adjudicators mostly impose permanent bans only for extreme conduct, such as fraud 
and Ponzi schemes depriving investors of millions.351 The overarching procedural 
ideal is to minimize punishment inflicted before it is clear that a wrong has 
occurred.  
 
5. Reputational Accuracy and Completeness 
 
A leading legislative sponsor of the Fair Credit Reporting Act explained the 
legislation through a memorable quote: “The loss of one’s good name is beyond 
price and makes one poor indeed.”352 Yet Amazon delists sellers based on ratings; 
Airbnb uses third-party data, such as from social media, to block guests before they 
have done anything wrong, reminiscent of the preemptive crime-fighting in the 
dystopian future portrayed in Minority Report;353 and Google allows victims’ 
reputations to be tarnished by refusing to demote clearly false websites even in the 
face of complaints.354 Platforms’ philosophy regarding reputation sits in tension 
with federal law in other areas. Most notably, federal rules block hearsay testimony 
                                                 
348 See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing this case). 
349 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing this case). 
350 12 C.F.R. § 226.13 (d)(1). 
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and withhold information about a defendant’s prior convictions from jurors.355  
Platforms’ nonchalance regarding reputation also allows for inaccuracies—the 
animating issue behind regulation of credit reports.356 But accuracy is not the only 
crucial goal. Information mistakenly omitted can deprive someone of a job or 
loan.357 In Haro v. Shilo Inn,358 a banquet services company decided to promote 
Robert Haro to manager, and ran a background check before doing so.359 The 
background check correctly reported that Haro had a charge of failing to register as 
a sex offender dismissed.360 That information implied that Haro may have had his 
case dismissed after properly registering as a sex offender. Based on this 
assumption, instead of promoting Haro, the banquet company terminated him.361 
However, the court had dismissed the charge of non-registry because it was a case 
of mistaken identity—Haro had never been accused of the original crime, only 
erroneously thought to need to register after someone else was convicted.362 A full 
report would have clarified that vital missing detail. 
The interests in reputational accuracy and completeness reflect a procedural 
justice emphasis on trustworthiness of the process.363 But they present a delicate 
balancing act, particularly when combined with other procedural interests such as 
caution in issuing temporary injunctions. TripAdvisor’s erasure of guest reviews 
about being assaulted underscores the need to limit the platform’s ability to self-
servingly provide incomplete reputational profiles.364 But a wrongly accused party 
also may suffer if unsubstantiated information persists.  
There will be hard cases and no set of rules will solve all problems. It is 
tempting to respond by leaving reputational issues, and indeed misinformation 
more broadly, out of any Platform Rules. Omission would be preferable to letting 
the issue of reputation derail the larger project. Again, however, it would be a 
mistake to allow the inevitable complexity and imperfection of new federal rules to 
perpetuate an even more problematic set of existing private rules. At a minimum, 
the above proposals for allowing parties to inspect internal adjudications should 
extend to being able to learn how reputation factored into platform punishment 
above a certain threshold—such as the termination of an account.365 Similarly, 
imposing a reasonable investigation requirement on accuracy and completeness of 
reputational profiles could help simply by prompting the platform to take greater 
care. Consumers should also have some means to challenge Google or Facebook 
when they allow extreme speech harms, such as denials of the Holocaust, or 
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fabrications of a student’s promiscuity, to persist at the top of search results.366  
Scholars have recognized that the Federal Rules’ allowance for court-appointed 
experts offers a solution to judges’ struggles in the “age of alternative facts.”367 An 
analogous means of accessing an independent fact-checker could help to address 
related problems in platforms. Given the discriminatory nature of online 
reputational ratings, restrictions on the use of such information—and heightened 
accountability for inaccuracy—is warranted.368 One of the chief targets for 
restrictions should be the big data predictive analytics that platforms such as Airbnb 
deploy to block access before the individual has done anything wrong.369 
Above all, the difficulty of line-drawing buttresses the case for obligatory 
decrees because it highlights the challenges facing platforms as the default 
procedural rule writers. Public laws would bring third parties, whether public courts 
or private appeals processes, into these thorny decisions. One pragmatic path 
forward would be to begin with specific rules for the clearest issues, such as 
transparency, notification, and independent appeals, alongside default rules and 
standards that platform common law can shape for harder issues. Ultimately, the 
most valuable contribution of Platform Rules would be providing a writ of habeas 
corpus for the information age by allowing an outside entity to check the currently 
unfettered power that platforms wield.  
 
D.  Enforcement of Rules 
 
For mandated procedures to work, they must be enforced. Two avenues for 
enforcement come through courts and administrative agencies. An integral feature 
is a private right of action for procedural violations. Such a lawsuit would be 
distinct from a right to pursue a public court appeal of the substantive decision made 
by a private platform or appeals board.370 Consumers have private rights of action 
to sue credit card companies and credit reporting agencies for failing to comply 
with statutory procedural requirements.371 These allow the consumer to recover not 
only attorneys’ fees and actual damages, but also punitive damages for willful 
procedural violations.372 
It may seem obvious that such a right exists with any mandate. Yet many 
procedural statutes lack private rights of action.373 Two design features would 
improve the effectiveness of a private right of action. First, parties must be able to 
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(finding that a U.S. resident stranded in Mumbai overnight by British Airways did not have standing under 14 
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challenge systemic failures, rather than solely individual cases. The court can 
reward the complaining party with punitive damages for identifying systemic issues 
affecting a larger group of people. In this regard, private rights of action for these 
procedural violations provide redress beyond class actions requiring similar 
substantive grievances. Instead, a private action may involve many different 
grievances with shared procedural shortcomings.  
Second, the punishment for significant violations must be substantial. The Fair 
Credit Reporting Act has proven inadequate to prevent inaccuracies in credit scores 
in part because the consequences are minimal if the credit agency is merely 
negligent.374 The company must only pay for damages incurred—such as a higher 
interest rate on a loan—and attorney’s fees.375 Not only are those actual damages 
arduous to prove, but they are capped at $1,000.376 Few consumers will sue and the 
bank therefore risks minimal, unlikely damages.377 And it is exceedingly rare to 
prove willful violations giving rise to substantial punitive damages.378 Thus, credit 
report procedures are structured to under-deter because a credit bureau will not pay 
significantly for flawed resolution of inaccuracies, but will benefit from saving 
costs that would otherwise be required to more accurately verify information. 
Unsurprisingly, credit reports have remained “riddled with inaccuracies” even after 
the procedural mandates.379 To increase the likelihood of compliance, procedural 
rights of action should enable damages commensurate with platform size for 
negligence in addition to willful violations.  
The judicial system has an important role to play in public oversight, but has 
limits. The time and energy required to exhaust a complex private process is already 
great, making it unlikely that parties would pursue the next, more resource-intense 
step of appealing to the public courthouse. Moreover, even in the private platform 
appeals system whole categories of disputes will never surface. As with credit 
reports, it “may prove practically impossible for consumers, when dealing with big-
data scoring systems that potentially integrate thousands of variables, to verify the 
accuracy of their scores and reports or to challenge decisions based on alternative 
models.”380 Public courts alone will provide suboptimal accountability if they rely 
solely on individuals to initiate cases. 
Administrative agencies can fill the sophistication gap by conducting regulatory 
audits of platforms’ dispute resolution systems.381 The most likely agency in the 
existing regulatory framework is the FTC, which has a broad cross-industry 
mandate. For audits to work, the platform must be required to keep records of the 
                                                 
374 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1).  
375 Id. 
376 Id. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (providing a cap); see Miller v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 3:05-CV-42-S, 2008 WL 
793683, at *7 n.7 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 24, 2008) (finding plaintiffs’ actual damages arguments unpersuasive). 
377 See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 29, at 84. 
378 See Alexandra P. Everhart Sickler, The (Un)Fair Credit Reporting Act, 28 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 
238, 256 (noting that the Fair Credit Reporting Act “limit[s] consumers’ ability” to receive damages by 
“imposing procedural hurdles that are difficult to satisfy”). 
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380 Id. at 189-90.  
381 For a similar proposal for regulatory auditing of complaints, see Van Loo, The Corporation as 
Courthouse, supra note 18. 
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entire process—thereby creating an “audit trail.”382 Similar record-keeping 
requirements are imposed in other areas of dispute resolution. For example, federal 
law instructs airlines to keep passenger complaints for government audit of 
procedural compliance with consumer protection laws.383 In one incident, after 
reviewing complaints, the Department of Transportation fined Delta Airlines 
$750,000 for bumping passengers from flights without first seeking volunteers and 
offering adequate compensation—in other words, for inadequate adjudicatory 
processes.384  
The regulator’s role would be to occasionally sample the platform’s dispute 
records and analyze aggregate complaint statistics, such as categories of 
complaints, rationales, and remedies deployed. This information would help 
identify grounds for regulatory prosecution of the platform for rule violations. Also, 
the regulator should have rulemaking authority to adapt compulsory procedures to 
fast-moving industries. Monitoring is the norm for most large industries—from 
banking to food manufacturing to pharmaceuticals.385 Chargebacks’ overall success 
likely benefits from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s close monitoring 
of credit card companies, including for effective chargeback systems.386 Regulatory 
monitoring of platform federal rules would thus be consistent with the overall 
modern regulatory framework for promoting compliance, as well as the existing 
governance of financial platform dispute resolution. 
 
E.  Objections 
 
In addition to the localized counterpoints addressed throughout this Article, 
several broader objections merit consideration. One objection views skeptically the 
willingness to leave dispute resolution mostly in private hands (and algorithms). If 
reforms are needed, why not instead improve the public court system? For cases 
involving speech, keeping the core decisions in private hands avoids concerns about 
authoritarian state censorship. For other types of conflicts, a public alternative could 
be part of the solution, but would require a massive and unlikely overhaul of the 
judicial system. Federal courts are already overburdened, managing over 1.5 
million cases annually.387 Handling even a hundred million platform disputes 
annually would require massive increases in resources and technology deployment 
to the public judicial system or to administrative law judges.388   
                                                 
382 Scholars have called for audit trails in other contexts. See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, supra note 15, at 
28 (calling for audit trails for automated scoring, such as for credit scores). 
383 14 C.F.R. § 259.5(b) (2011). 
384 Bart Jansen, Delta Fined for Violating Bumping Rules – Again, USA TODAY (June 26, 2013, 4:36 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/2013/06/26/delta-fine-bumping/2461229/. 
385 See Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors, supra note 250, at 436-40. 
386 See Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of Surveillance, 
72 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1620 (2019) (noting that financial institutions are some of the most heavily regulated 
businesses). 
387 U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 2019 (compiling information of pending 
federal court cases). 
388 Administrative agencies come with greater risk of capture than do courts. On the problem of capture, 
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Large companies whose core competency is technological sophistication are 
better situated to repurpose algorithms and big data to sift through large numbers 
of cases at low cost. As operators of the platforms, they also have the ability to 
automate the collection of information, and to police problematic behavior, far 
more efficiently.389 Unless and until unprecedented institutional capacity is built in 
the public sector, platforms must handle the vast majority of disputes internally. 
This Article’s proposals simply provide public oversight of those inevitably private 
systems. 
Others will have the opposite concern, that public involvement may prove 
inefficient or a detrimental to platform justice.390 Why not leave it to markets to 
self-adjust in response to user demand? Such skepticism is appropriate not only for 
procedural mandates, but for almost all regulation. Nobel-prize winning work has 
debunked the notion that markets will solve every problem, through research 
establishing pervasive market failures, such as the puzzling persistence of used car 
dealers who continue to sell “lemons” even though laissez-faire economics suggests 
that such sellers would be driven out of the market by word-of-mouth.391 Just as it 
is hard to know beforehand whether someone has bought a lemon, it is too onerous 
for consumers to assess the quality of a platform’s dispute system before joining. 
Those challenges help explain how platforms could persist with flawed dispute 
resolution even if competition is assumed to be robust.  
Throughout history, policy makers initially believed that regulation was 
unnecessary in most industries. From Upton Sinclair’s exposure of the 
meatpackers, to banks’ risky behavior preceding the financial crisis of the 2000s, 
to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, to Boeing pressuring 
regulators to ease off their fatal 737 MAX design, legislators have ultimately 
concluded that originally lax regulation posed a societal threat and greater public 
oversight was necessary to complement private autonomy.392 Similarly, concerns 
that regulation would “kill the internet” drove early scholarly examinations, the 
legacy of which persists today.393 In light of other industries’ histories of failed self-
regulation and platforms’ early missteps, expecting platforms to solve all their own 
governance problems would be unrealistic—especially because competition has 
limited effects on many leading platforms.394  
Additionally, the government already imposes diverse public duties on the 
largest companies, including conscripting the largest U.S. companies to regulate 
                                                 
389 See David S. Evans, Governing Bad Behavior by Users of Multi-Sided Platforms, 27 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1201, 1201 (2012). 
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third parties.395 For instance, the FTC has forced Facebook into a law enforcement 
role to ensure that app developers and other parties comply with consumer 
protection and privacy laws, and oil companies are expected to monitor all of their 
contractors’ compliance.396 It is methodologically difficult to establish that any 
particular legal intervention is justified.397 In particular, it is impossible to know the 
counterfactual, because without regulation companies may over time yield to public 
pressure as Facebook has done in creating its Oversight Board. Yet public pressure 
fades, and the level faced by Facebook is unusually intense and thus unlikely to be 
applied to every large platform whose dispute resolution is in need of improvement. 
It also bears emphasis that existing oversight of the world’s largest companies, 
including mandated dispute resolution procedures for credit conflicts and online 
copyright violations, has not kept those firms from being highly profitable global 
leaders in their industries.398  
In short, one option is to risk trusting platforms alone to police market entry, 
preserve reputation, and protect the “engangered species”399 of objective facts. 
However, since established tools are readily available and markets have generally 
failed in self-regulating, a more promising option would be providing platforms 
with public partners in their difficult adjudicatory tasks. 
Another potential objection focuses on the distinction between dispute 
resolution and governance. Namely, a dispute arises whether Amazon bans a 
merchant because of complaints from other traders or Amazon identifies an issue 
on its own. What do we gain by viewing platform decisions about users from more 
of a judicial perspective, rather than as an executive or legislative entity? 
Conceptual precision is valuable. Conflicts are central to platforms because 
intermediation defines them.400 Internal policies and algorithmic adjudications 
develop through an iterative feedback loop, informed heavily by those conflicts.401 
Therefore, a rigorous institutional analysis of dispute resolution is crucial to 
examining platform policies. It is thus essential to understanding the nature of 
platforms and their place in society.  
From a public policy standpoint, adopting a dispute resolution perspective can 
help the networked society flourish. To illustrate, in early 2020 Facebook and 
Twitter rejected House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s request to delete a heavily edited 
video, posted by President Trump, implying that she ripped up his State of the 
Union speech as he honored one of the last survivors of World War II African-
American pilots who integrated the U.S. Army’s Air Forces.402 In considering 
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396 Id.  
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Pelosi’s claim, Facebook applied a policy that it had rolled out a month before: 
content would be removed if it “would likely mislead someone into thinking that a 
subject of the video said words that they did not actually say.”403 Because Pelosi 
had in fact torn up the speech, the video did not meet that standard.404 Prior to its 
recent policy, the company had long resisted the idea of removing manipulated 
media, but reversed its “anything goes” position after receiving intense criticism 
from users and the public.405  
The Pelosi-Trump dispute shows not only the litigation process for new cases 
based on platforms’ established policies, but also the incredible power involved. 
Responsiveness to public pressure offers a form of accountability. But an 
independent appeals process would help insulate the platform’s judicial function 
from undue influence. It would be easier for the President or Speaker of the House 
to pressure a CEO, who has considerable stock and much to lose from increased 
government scrutiny, than a large independent pool of appeals judges who have 
guaranteed salaries.406 
To be clear, this Article’s thesis does not require seeing platforms as closer to 
courts than to administrative agencies or governors. Indeed, depictions of 
platforms’ executive function underscore the need for a judicial check on that 
authority. If administrative agencies are the governmental analogy of choice for 
platforms, it bears emphasis that the Administrative Procedure Act sets forth rules 
for formal administrative agency hearings, including cross-examinations, apprising 
parties of material facts, and the agency’s power of appeal.407 Agencies have 
detailed published rules used in administrative judge hearings, modeled after the 
Federal Rules.408 Those formal rules are missing from existing law and technology 
conversations about process.409 Given many similarities between those 
administrative rules and the Federal Rules, both agencies and courts as the 
government analog would indicate similar policy implications as those put forth in 
this Article.410  
A final potential source of pushback is that the focus on process is inadequate, 
if not detrimental to the most important substantive issues needing regulatory 
attention. In this view, focusing on process provides a safe way to intervene without 
actually prohibiting any specified bad conduct. At its worst, lawyers’ misguided 
“faith in procedure” could create an excessively complex and costly process only 
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navigable by sophisticated parties.411  
Admittedly, procedural reforms will not solve all of platforms’ problems. Most 
substantive decisions would remain in private hands. But improving procedural 
quality leads to better substantive outcomes.412 In particular, a neutral appeals body 
could reduce racial discrimination, debilitating account terminations, or fake news 
even when profit motives may insufficiently push the platform to fix those and other 
problems. 
Furthermore, for much of modern history, the prevailing view was that the 
substantive outcome drove people’s perception of justice.413 A set of experiments 
in the 1980s changed that narrative.414 Through survey instruments designed to 
assess people’s perceptions of a judicial process, psychologists demonstrated that 
the procedure for reaching an outcome influences people’s perception of its 
legitimacy as much, if not more than, the substantive outcome.415 The reforms 
above incorporate that research into what matters to people.  
Additionally, dispute resolution interventions offer a means for substantial steps 
toward justice as perceived by the consumer. They are an essential part of any 
comprehensive solution to regulate platforms. Moreover, mandating procedures is 
more politically viable than substantive interventions. Businesses have increasingly 
realized that effective and legitimate dispute resolution improves profits.416 For 
those who oppose regulation on the grounds that it impinges on private autonomy, 
especially for matters involving speech, procedural interventions are more 
appealing because they largely preserve the private sector’s ability to make 
substantive decisions.417  
To be clear, these and other objections raise valid concerns that can inform and 
improve platforms’ procedural design. The strategy is for the dispute architecture 
to leverage the strengths of both public and private sectors. Ultimately, whether the 
system is public, private, or hybrid, for whatever substantive laws exist, a set of 
procedures will govern the resolution of platform disputes. Those procedures will 
influence outcomes and the quality of administered justice. The design of those 
rules, whether mandated or voluntary, would ideally reflect norms not only of 
private sector efficiency and innovation, but also the public value in procedural 
justice.  
 
                                                 
411 Cf. Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 387-93 (2019) (discussing how 
repeat industry players benefit from excess procedure). 
412 See Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications For Civil 
Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 434 (1992) (“[B]ias, honesty, and expertise . . . are believed to 
influence the ability of a procedure to reach an objectively correct outcome”). 
413 TYLER, supra note 16, at 5. 
414 Id. at 9. 
415 See id. (showing more broadly the value of procedural justice to the law); Torben Hansen et al., 
Managing Consumer Complaints: Differences and Similarities Among Heterogeneous Retailers, 38 INT’L J. 
RETAIL DISTRIBUTION MGMT. 6, 10 (2010) (reviewing the literature and concluding that for consumers the 
process may matter more than the outcome). 
416 Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, supra note 18. 
417 Cf. Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for 
“Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212-13 (2003) (“[P]aternalism prevents people from 
behaving in their own best interests”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576562
50                                               Platform Procedure [17-Apr-20 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has begun to sketch the contours of a necessarily much larger 
project. With or without intervention, tech platforms play a court-like role in 
society, resolving disagreements between merchant and consumer, driver and 
passenger, or two interlocutors in the modern public square. Financial platforms—
most notably credit card companies and credit reporting agencies—by their nature 
serve as intermediaries in private adjudicatory processes. Unlike tech platforms, 
however, financial platforms’ dispute resolution proceedings are subject to 
minimum legal standards such as conducting reasonable investigations and 
notifying parties. A central challenge in platform governance moving forward is 
determining how to shape the ongoing mass, secretive trials that can define people’s 
identities and banish them from communities.  
In the framers’ vision for a new country’s judicial system, they began not with 
due process, but with Article III: “The judicial power of the United States shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish.”418 As societal power migrates to platforms in the 
information age, something like a constitutional convention—with a diverse array 
of stakeholders—is needed to design a system of checks and balances. A 
fundamental part of that enterprise would be deciding whether Congress should 
ordain and establish a platform supreme court and federal rules of platform 
procedure for billions of disputes currently relegated to sometimes brutish colonial-
style justice.  
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